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I. INTRODUCTION
The care of each man's soul, and of the things of heaven, which
neither does belong to the commonwealth, nor can be subjected to it, is
left entirely to every man's self.
- John Locke, 1689
We are talking about Christianizing America. We are talking about
simply spreading the Gospel in a political context.
- Paul Weyrich, 1980
POPULAR MYTHOLOGY has painted the United States as a bastion of
religious freedom, a place where religious liberties are and always have
been respected. Many outsiders and many citizens perceive those free-
doms as stemming from a historic separation of church and state. There
are those, however, who believe that religious freedom in the United
States should be equated with a benign tolerance of non-Christian faiths
while recognizing the fact that the United States is a "Christian nation."'
Some persons in this latter group argue that the Constitution does not
require or create a purely secular state, and that the strict separationist
approach currently practiced by the Supreme Court is the novelty.2
The last ten to fifteen years has witnessed a marked increase in the
number and visibility of Americans who believe religion should play a
larger role in government.3 For some the goal is simple, explicit, and
' Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-71 (1892); see also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.").
2 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIvIALIzE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 86 (1993); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS,
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 82 (1986); E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks
Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1994). But cf. ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: THE ASSAULT ON TOLERANCE & PLURALISM IN
AMERICA 155-62 (1994); David AJ. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary
Constitutionalism: A Research Agenda for Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1, 5 (1993).
See Richard L. Berke, For G.O.P. Religious Right Plays Waiting Game in Iowa,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al (estimating one-quarter to one-half of the Republican
electorate in Iowa is considered part of the religious conservative movement); William
Booth, Southern Voters Switching Sides: Conservatives Abandoning Democratic Party
for GOP, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1995, at Al (noting the "awesome power of the
Christian right in a deeply religious region [the South]"); Gustav Niebuhr, Public
Supports Political Voice For Churches, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1996, at Al (reporting
on the increasing power of evangelical Protestants in the U.S. political arena); see also
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extreme: to create a nation that conducts itself in accordance with Chris-
tian biblical teachings.' Others merely wish to recognize the importance
of Judeo-Christian morality in American public life, and to foster tradi-
tional or "family" values that are based upon the Judeo-Christian creed.
Often this push for family values is justified by its proponents as simply
answering the "mandate" of the people.5
Over the last several decades, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
emphasized the secular nature of the state, and has denied organized
religion the ability to assert its interests in governmental affais.' Howev-
er, those who oppose a purely secular state are not limiting themselves to
a judicial battle; they are also waging war in national, state, and local
legislatures. Since religious activism shows no signs of waning, it is
likely that the debate over the proper role of religion in American politics
and law will only become more heated as time goes on, which leads to
the logical questions: is it wise to insert religion into political and legal
matters, and is it necessary to do so to protect religious freedoms?7
BARRY A. KoSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD 198 (1993)
(discussing the future importance of the religious right in national elections and
politics).
4 See WALTER H. CAPPs, THE NEW RELIGIOUS RIGHT. PIErY, PATRIOTISM, AND
POLITICS ix (1994); John H. Garvey, Fundamentalism and American Law, in
FUNDAmENTAUSMS AND THE STATE: 28, 34-36, 41 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby eds., 1993) (noting the fundamentalists' belief that government should enforce
rules of personal virtue, that law should reform other people's behavior, and that the
public/private distinctions of liberal constitutionalism are mistaken).
5 See NEuHAUS, supra note 2, at 40 ("A religious community that no longer
understands itself as an embattled minority begins to think more about influence than
about tolerance."). Interestingly, current political terminology, which emphasizes
"mandates from the people," is reminiscent of religious claims that certain events are
"signs from God." In either context, the signs or mandates are taken as legitimating the
current path and encouraging continued progress.
" See id. at 25. Some claim that this strict neutrality has in fact disfavored religion
in violation of the Constitution. See Wallace, supra note 2, at 1200.
' One reason for minimizing the role of religion in the laws of a pluralist state is
the probability that minority human rights will be violated. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani,
Religion and International Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 195, 208-09 (1988).
Another is that the potential for violence and religious extremism increases exponential-
ly when religious forces are allowed to influence government policy. Steve Bruce,
Fundamentalism, Ethnicity, and Enclave, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra
note 4, at 50, 65 (citing Northern Ireland as an example of what can happen when
pluralist societies mix church and state); see also Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby,
Conclusion: Remaking the State: The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra note 4, at 620, 633 (noting that some ex-
perts believe political expediencies will moderate violent tendencies in some secular
1997]
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One way to answer these questions is to undertake a comparative
constitutional analysis to establish the wisdom or fallacy of religio-legal
unity.8 By looking at an example of a nation which has implemented the
desired legal system, one can gauge its effect.
A comparative study is most useful when the countries compared are
similar in all respects except for the variable being compared. Because of
differences in history, politics, law, and sociology, it is impossible to find
a perfect match in the real world; however, as long as the extent and
existence of other variables is known, value can be found in an imperfect
comparison.
In the context of religio-legal relationships, one of the best countries
to compare with the United States is Ireland. Although Ireland is politi-
cally and historically different from the United States, it is similar enough
in key areas that a comparative study is appropriate. In addition, the Irish
Constitution contains certain provisions that are substantially similar to
those that religious activists9 in the United States want to incorporate into
the U.S. Constitution. Ireland also faces pressures associated with being
part of a more liberal federal entity (the European Union), just as some
states in the United States struggle with being part of a larger federation
that sometimes propounds more liberal religio-legal precepts than they
would wish.
Section II of this Article studies in greater detail the religio-legal
debate currently being waged in American courts and legislatures, includ-
ing a brief discussion of the religio-legal history of the United States.
Section II also describes how the United States resembles and differs
from Ireland such that subsequent comparisons will be more accurate.
democracies, but that as frustration levels rise, violence may occur). One commentator
has remarked that "Christians who accept the proposition that there can be justifiable
violence in warfare should also be able to accept, however reluctantly, the justification
of revolutionary violence." NEUHAuS, supra note 2, at 70; cf. Thomas Aquinas, The
Summa of Theology, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETIHcs 30, 64-65
(Paul E. Sigmund trans. & ed., 1988) (outlining the circumstances of just warfare).
' The inherent value of the comparative law method is discussed in John H.
Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 545, 545, 554 (1995). Professor Langbein also notes the unfortunate scarcity
of comparative legal analyses in American law and scholarship. Id. at 547-50.
" In the context of this Article, the term "religious activist" is used to refer to
those persons who actively support the inclusion of religious values in the law of the
state. It does not refer to politically active persons who have ties to organized religion,
but who do not have as their goal the inclusion of religious principles in law. The
term "religious right" is used to refer to religious activists who have a conservative
religio-political world view.
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Section III compares the two constitutions by analyzing the provi-
sions and policies most influenced by religion. First, general principles of
sovereignty and constitutional interpretation are reviewed to understand
the general constitutional framework of each nation. Second, the manner
in which personal rights are treated by each nation's constitution is
studied. This section discusses what is often called "family law," includ-
ing issues of abortion, marriage, divorce, and the rights of women,
children, and homosexuals. The use of the term "personal rights" is
conscious, and is intended to emphasize the modem focus on the rights
of the individual as opposed to the rights of the family unit. The term
"personal rights" also recognizes that many of the legal questions that fall
under the "family law" rubric have little to do with familial relationships
per se, and more to do with individual choice. Third, constitutional provi-
sions regarding education are considered.
Section IV of this Article analyzes the extent to which Irish and
American laws comply with international human rights conventions
concerning religious rights. Section IV also discusses whether the inclu-
sion of religion in law tends to increase or decrease the potential for
violence within and between societies.
Section V discusses where each nation is headed in terms of religion
and law, and offers suggestions as to what the United States and Ireland
should do to create an optimal religious rights framework.
II. THE CONFLICTING DEMANDS OF RELIGION AND STATE
A. The United States: Past and Present
1. Proposals by the American Religious Right
When asked what the biggest challenge to American democracy
would be in the 1990s and beyond, a number of legal and political com-
mentators replied "religious fundamentalism," despite the fact that the
United States is considered by many to be the model of strict separation
of church and state and a bastion of religious freedom."0 Certainly those
conclusions are warranted on the basis of a reading of the text of the
U.S. Constitution." However, in practice religion has not always been
distinct from American government, and there are continuing efforts to
1o See Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, Introduction, in FUNDAMENTAUiSMS
AND THE STATE, supra note 4, at 1, 1.
" "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof.. . ..." U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, some religious
activists believe that because the words "separation of church and state" do not appear
in the Constitution, it is not part of our legal system. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
supra note 2, at 4-6.
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increase the role religion plays in the law. For example, there have been
numerous, albeit unsuccessful, attempts over the years to amend the
Constitution to reflect Christian "values" or moral precepts. 12 The 1994
election brought both a Republican House of Representatives and a
Republican Senate into being, both of which cited a mandate from the
people to institute not only economic change, but moral and social change
as well. 3 The 1996 Republican presidential primaries were also heavily
influenced by religious and moral factors. There have been numerous
discussions regarding the possibility of proposing constitutional amend-
ments or other federal legislation concerning prayer, education, and
"'moral issues" during the two sessions of Republican control. 4
The last fifteen years have seen a sharp increase in the number of
religious activists in the American political arena. 5 The admitted goal of
the movement is the national acknowledgement of the Christian nature of
2 Although the Eighteenth Amendment, which instituted Prohibition, may have been
passed due to the combined efforts of religious activists and social conservatives, that
Amendment was flouted throughout its fourteen-year term, and was finally repealed in
1933. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. This
failure to impose biblical or religious legislation on the nation suggests that even if
religious and social conservatives prevail in their current efforts, the political process
may eventually reverse their reforms, because legislation that contradicts the majority's
beliefs cannot survive. See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 48-49, 52-53 (stating that the
current system of secularization contradicts the electorate's morals and will not survive).
But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
195, 195 (1992) (noting the little "rampant secularization" in modem American society).
However, during that time much damage will be done to the concept of religious lib-
erty and the rights of members of minority religions.
" See Laurie Goodstein, Gingrich Vows to Pursue Christian Coalition Agenda,
WASH. POST, May 18, 1995, at Al (discussing, inter alia, the Republican view on
abortion, school prayer, and public school funding).
,' One of the more interesting debates that has come out of this increase in religio-
political activism is the discussion about whether there can ever be a truly valueless or
neutral society. See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
305, 313, 327-28 (1990) (arguing that the liberal ideal of neutrality among moral
choices has failed). Religious activists often ask why their perspective is considered pre-
sumptively invalid while other world views, which are based on different conceptions
of the good, are not. See id. This is a complex issue, and has been addressed by a
number of prominent commentators. See, e.g., infra note 290 and accompanying text;
see also infra notes 316-25 (discussing ways in which religious perspectives can be
incorporated into the secular state).
IS Most experts mark 1980 as the turning point, with political activism among re-
ligious groups growing throughout the 1990s. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra
note 2, at 9; KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 157-66, 179; MATrHIw C. MOEN,
THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND CONGRESS 30-31 (1989).
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the United States, and the concurrent passage of legislation that will
effectuate the moral precepts of Christianity.'6 Some lip service has been
paid to the "Judeo-Christian tradition," but many observers believe that
the concept is a modem invention created to answer the demands of a
pluralist society." And, while some of those within the movement may
be unsure of the role of Judaism in a Christian America, the role of other
religious faiths is even more suspect."
In some regards, the religious right has been very explicit about its
political goals. In addition to the recognition that America is a Christian
nation, today's religious activists want to see (Christian) prayer in school;
tax credits for religious schools; the outlawing of abortion, homosexuality,
and euthanasia/assisted suicide; increased burdens on obtaining divorce
(perhaps through the repeal of "no-fault divorce"); and the return of the
family to its "rightful place" in society." Despite this extremely broad
,6 See CAPPS, supra note 4, at ix, 35-39; KOSmIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at
281; Garvey, supra note 4, at 41, 43-44 (citing religious activists as believing that
"America should acknowledge its dependence on God and that our law should be based
on the Bible").
'7 See Martin E. Marty, The Virginia Statute Two Hundred Years Later, in THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES 1,
17 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988); see also CARTER, supra
note 2, at 87; KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 211-12 (reporting that 55.9% of
American males and 60.6% of American females describe themselves as Protestant
Christians). Approximately 25% of the American population self-affiliates with Catholi-
cism, thus creating a nation that is approximately 80-85% Christian. See id. Ireland, on
the other hand, is over 90% Catholic. See JOHN ARDAGH, IRELAND AND THE IRISH:
PORTRAIT OF A CHANGING SOCIETY 158 (1994).
28 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that presidential
candidate/evangelist Pat Robertson stated that those who were neither Jewish nor
Christian were not qualified to be in government); see also id. at 70 (quoting Rev.
Baily Smith, an influential figure in the religious right, as saying, "God Almighty does
not hear the prayer of a Jew"); MOEN, supra note 15, at 40.
"9 See MOEN, supra note 15, at 87; Dirk Johnson, Attacking No-Fault Notion, Con-
servatives Try to Put Blame Back in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 10.
Most religious activists in the United States are Christians claiming to impose a
"Judeo-Christian" ethic on the nation. However, the religious necessity of doing so is
not as doctrinally clear in Christianity as it is in other faiths. See Maimon
Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water
or Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903, 907-10
(1992). For example, both Islam and Judaism require their adherents to attempt to
create a good society on earth, because their individual redemption depends on such
actions. Christians, who have a tradition of "rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's,"
see Mark 12:17, do not necessarily have such a duty, or at least are not required to
do so for individual salvation. However, varying interpretations of religious obligations
19971
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social agenda and the fact that many religious activists deny the legitima-
cy of a public-private distinction when it comes to religion,' the
movement's leaders claim that they do not envision America becoming a
theocracy.2 However, that claim is suspect in light of the scope of the
claims of populist religion to interact with the state, the ease with which
religious movements and religious leaders can turn a reform movement
into a revolution, and the current social and political climate of the
United States.
The current brand of American Christianity is much more politically
active, politically effective, and politically comprehensive than almost any
that has come before. It combines the elimination of public-private
distinctions that were typical of the Puritan tradition with an energetic
social interventionism more often seen in Latin American liberation theol-
ogy.' The voting strength of the religious right has been demonstrated
in virtually every election since 1980, and is predicted to continue to rise
through the end of the century.24 Even though some discount the impor-
tance of the religious right due to its lack of a political majority, others
note that even a small number of politically dedicated voters can bring
about a revolution.' In addition, the religious right's effectiveness is
seen not only in its ability to elect its candidates to both national and
exist, and what may not be religiously required may be deemed to be religiously
desirable.
' See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 18-19; Garvey, supra note 4, at 39; CARTER,
supra note 2, at 160; Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and
Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 837, 839-41 (1995). A growing number of legal commentators are beginning to
arrive at similar conclusions, namely that religious individuals cannot separate their
beliefs into those that are private (and may therefore be affected by religion) from
those that are public (and therefore may not be affected by religion); for these persons,
all beliefs and behaviors are influenced by their religious perspective.
" See CAPPs, supra note 4, at 15. The Ayatollah Khomeini also denied his intent
to create a theocracy prior to the Islamic revolution in Iran. See MALISE RuTHVEN,
ISLAM IN THE WORLD 356 (1984).
" See Garvey, supra note 4, at 36.
3 Conservative religious activists claim that they are modeling themselves on the
civil rights activism of liberal theologians in the 1960s. See MOaN, supra note 15, at
20.
24 See KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 283.
'5 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 131-33; NEUHAUS, supra note
2, at 40. In addition, the electoral college system, in conjunction with "single-issue
voting," has made the South, an historically conservative region in terms of both reli-
gion and politics, a major player in national elections. See KOsMIN & LACHMAN, supra
note 3, at 198-99, 281. This is especially true given the increasingly "Southern" feel
of populist religion. See also Booth, supra note 3.
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local office, but also in its ability to bring its issues to the forefront of
Congressional debate in record time.H
Currently, the American religio-political arena is populated by a
number of engaging and popularly appealing personalities Although
some in the religious right hesitate to put all their faith in a single
leaderr one of the hallmarks of the religious right is the ability of a
single leader to mobilize followers and to use relatively small voting
blocs to swing an election 9 It has been noted that one of the reasons
why, after decades of discontent and at least one marginally successful
religious revolution in 1906, Islamic fundamentalists in Iran were able to
overthrow the secular government in 1979 and institute a theocratic state
was because the population was drawn to the personality of Ayatollah
Ruh Allah Khomeini." Revolution, or at least violent civil protest, is
also a continual threat in a country such as the United States, which was
created as a result of violent revolution, and which glorifies the myth of
the citizen-soldier-martyr as part of its popular culture'
What has brought about this surge in religio-political activism?
Certainly Americans have always been among the most devout people in
the world. Originally religious extremists who were exiled by force or by
choice from their native lands, Americans continued their devotion to God
through the 1800s and 1900s.32 Sociologists believe that the current
See MOEN, supra note 15, at 3, 65, 129 (noting the increasing ability of
Christian activists to shape Congressional agenda or alternatives). The corollary effect
of the religious right's lobbying activities has been the legitimization of its political
agenda; whereas 30 years ago it was considered inappropriate to incorporate religious
arguments into a political discussion, it has now become commonplace. See ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 60-61 (noting Jerry Falwell's 1965 statement
that religious figures should not become involved in politics); NEUHAUS, supra note 2,
at 42-43.
" See CAPPS, supra note 4, at 185-86 (discussing interviews with major religious
figures in the United States). Pat Buchanan's early success in the 1996 Republican
Presidential primaries demonstrates the appeal certain charismatic individuals can have
beyond their traditional demographic supporters.
' See Berke, supra note 3.
29 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 31 (stating Christian activists
plan to take advantage of the fact that only 6-15% of the eligible voters decide the
outcome of any given election); see also NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing
"personality cults").
30 See HENRY MUNSON, JR., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 131-33
(1988); RUTVEN, supra note 21, at 334-38.
3, See Malcolm Gladwell, At Root of Modern Militias: A Legacy of Revolt, WASH.
POST, May 9, 1995, at Al.
32 See ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-1990:
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renaissance of religious fervor in U.S. culture and politics reflects the
distress many Americans feel at the rapid changes that have occurred over
the last few decades and the resulting feelings of frustration and
helplessness." Analysts of religious and other radical reform or revolu-
tionary movements have noted that these sorts of feelings can often lead
to a renewed interest in spiritual concerns, which may be accompanied by
anti-government and anti-secular sentiments." Wide disparities in social
or economic status within the community can also contribute to a lack of
identification with the party in power. 5 Such disparities can lead to
extreme shifts in the political pendulum, or even to violence. Although
some commentators believe the democratic nature of the U.S. political
system will protect the country from violent religious revolution,37 radi-
cal changes brought about by political and legislative reform could still
occur.
Some people discount the threat posed by religious activists in the
United States, believing that "it could never happen here."'38 However,
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 15 (1992).
33 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 144; KOSMIN & LACHMAN,
supra note 3, at 281-82.
' See Marty & Appleby, supra note 10, at 10; David C. Rapoport, Comparing
Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE,
supra note 4, at 429, 429-31, 454-56.
31 See Marty & Appleby, supra note 7, at 624. The United States is currently ex-
periencing both social and economic disparities of an almost unprecedented magnitude.
See Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
17, 1995, at Al; Dale Russakoff, Grass Roots Rage: Below the Surface, Alienation
Simmers in Corner of Mid-America, WASH. POST, May 5, 1995, at Al.
See Timothy Egan, Federal Uniforms Become Target of Wave of Threats and
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at Al; Faye Ginsburg, Saving America's Souls,
in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra note 4, at 557, 563, 574, 579; Russakoff,
supra note 35. But cf Rapoport, supra note 34, at 429-32 (noting that political reform,
not violence, is more likely to occur in the United States).
- See Rapoport, supra note 34, at 432. However, historians have noted patterns of
political violence in American social movements. See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 574;
see also Gladwell, supra note 31.
Interestingly, the founder of Operation Rescue cited "necessity" as the reason why
laws can be disregarded; the same reason was used by the Ayatollah Khomeini to
supersede the religious law he had previously held to be immutable. Compare Ginsburg,
supra note 36, at 564, with Sarvenaz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic of Iran,
and International Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 145, 159-62 (1992).
38 See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 41 ("Revolutions . . . are declared impossible
before they happen and inevitable after they happen."). Iran is a case in point Prior
to the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iran was well on its way to becoming a modern
[Vol. 29:001
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despite the fact that the United States is currently perceived as a model
of religious toleration,3 9 its history contains persistent religious persecu-
tion by both its citizens and its state and federal governments.' It is
also true that change is inevitable; American history is full of examples
of rights that once seemed inviolate being eroded over time4' and princi-
ples that once seemed impossibly radical becoming commonplace.42 Just
secular society until conservative religious elements of Iranian society banded together
with other segments of society to expel the Shah. Once the revolution was underway,
the religious elements took over, much to the surprise of the intellectuals and middle
class who had initially supported the clerics. In the United States, fiscal conservatives
are joining with the religious right in what they believe is a temporary but necessary
coalition to gain control of government It remains to be seen, however, whether
moderate conservatives will be able to keep the religious activists in line, or whether,
like the Iranian elite, they will have to cede control to populist religious leaders.
"' Although religious toleration may seem to be the proper goal of all nations, the
term "toleration" still connoies an attitude of benevolent permission by the ruling class
or party. See Daniel J. Boorstein, The Founding Fathers and the Courage to Doubt, in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 207, 209 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985); Thomas
S. Buckley, The Political Theology of Thomas Jefferson, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 75, 91. It is better to aspire to religious equali-
ty, where no belief system (including the lack of belief) is considered superior to any
other.
' See KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 34-37; see also Harold J. Berman,
Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35 EMORY LJ. 777,
779-83 (1986); Underkuffier-Freund, supra note 20, at 879-91 (reviewing the history of
intolerance and persecution in the United States).
" At one time, the right to own other human beings was not only constitutionally
protected, but as divinely ordained. See U.S. CONST. art. V, amend. XIII (prohibiting
constitutional amendments until 1808, thus protecting the institution of slavery; slavery
was not eliminated until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865). See
KOsMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 37-40; see also Aquinas, supra note 7, at 82-83
(discussing the justification of slavery by natural law). Slavery involved not only the
conflict between natural rights claimed by both slaves and slave owners, but also
various property rights. Over the course of centuries, the "right" to own other human
beings has eroded and disappeared in the United States and throughout the Western
world. But see Today's News, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 17, 1995, at I (noting Mississippi's
formal abolition of slavery on March 16, 1995, when it finally ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; "most current legislators" were allegedly unaware
that Mississippi had not previously ratified the amendment).
42 As recently as the 1910s, women's suffrage was either ridiculed or viewed as a
threat to the political system. Today, no one in America could reasonably argue that
women should not be able to vote. Over the course of eighty years, the country's
beliefs and laws have made a dramatic shift.
One area that may be subject to change over the next several decades is that of
same-sex marriages. Today, marriage between two members of the same sex is seen by
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because religion and state are separate today does not mean that they will
always remain so, especially in light of recent political movements and
Supreme Court decisions.
2. Looking to the Past to Define the Present
As legal scholars try to divine the correct meaning and interpretation
of the First Amendment and the role of religion in America, many look
to the past for assistance. Unfortunately, the past does not provide a
conclusive answer.43 Even if it did, that answer might not be appropriate
for modem society. Just as tort and criminal laws must evolve to adapt
to a changing society, so must constitutional law.
Nevertheless, historical arguments regarding the role of religion in
law abound.' The first period analyzed is the colonial period. By look-
ing at the Christian aspirations, invocations, and mandates found in the
charters of the original colonies, religious activists believe they can show
some as "counterfeit," unnatural, ungodly, and illegal. See David W. Dunlap, Some
States Trying to Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995,
at A18. Yet as recently as 1967, interracial marriages were seen in exactly the same
light. See id. However, in that year, the Supreme Court granted constitutional protection
to what was once seen as blasphemous. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see
also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (discussing the Ha-
bitual Criminal Sterilization Act); cf. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,
801, 806 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the social history of euthanasia and abortion).
Religious activists have promised to make same-sex marriage an election year issue, see
Adam Nagourney, Christian Coalition Pushes for Showdown on Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1996, at A19, despite the Supreme Court's recent ruling pro-
hibiting overt discrimination against homosexuals, see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996).
'4 However, at least some people have recognized the inadequacy of mere historical
analysis. Stephen Carter, paraphrasing legal scholar Harold Berman, notes that "the
original understanding of [the First Amendment] may no longer bind us because
contemporary reality is so sharply discontinuous with the world of the Founders."
CARTER, supra note 2, at 119; Berman, supra note 40, at 778-79. However, this is not
to say history is completely irrelevant. Often a nation's historical approach to a certain
issue will reflect the boundaries of potential change. Any attempt to exceed the outer
limits of culturally tolerable change may result in counter-revolution. For an interesting
legal approach that incorporates, but does not exclusively rely upon, historicity, see
Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76
CALIF. L. RaY. 779, 779 (1988).
4 See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTTTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.2 (2d ed. 1992). However, they do not
necessarily get it right. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 523, 524-25 (1995).
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the "Christian nature" of the nation." However, not only do these char-
ters predate the Constitution, and are thus not legally binding, but the
concepts the charters espoused, namely Christianity in government, were
ultimately rejected by the Founders.4 One purported reason for the fail-
ure to include Christianity in the law of the land was a lack of consen-
sus. Apparently, no one could agree about what elements should be
included in the Constitution.47
The second historical period that comes under close scrutiny is the
time of the signing of the Constitution and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. For many, it seems, the key to unraveling the contemporary
conflicts between religion and government lies in understanding the
Framers' intent."8 Although determining legislative intent can be a help-
ful tool in deciding how to approach certain legal problems, it is not
useful here. First, there is no consensus regarding what the Framers
intended. Both sides can find support for their arguments in the actions
and statements of the Constitutional delegates.49 Second, historical ana-
4 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 157. Many of these charters use
language similar to that found in the constitutions of sectarian states such as Ireland.
Compare id. at 157 with IR. CONST. arts. 1-2, cited in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992); id. at
preamble.
' See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 157. In this context, "Christiani-
ty in government!' means the establishment of Christianity as a governmental institution.
At first the colonists tried to repeat the conformist approach to religion that they had
experienced in Europe, but eventually religious toleration became the norm, either
through adoption of Enlightenment theory or through necessity. See Wallace, supra note
2, at 1228. By the time the American Revolution occurred, even those who were
against religious freedom in theory had to accept it in practice, since no one denomina-
tion had a sufficient number- of followers to establish itself as the national religion. See
FINKE & STARK, supra note 32, at 59.
' See KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 23-24. This outcome is predictable
if one accepts the position that the need to separate church and state often grows as
the population becomes more religiously diverse. See Sarah Lyall, Schools Stumble Over
a Tough Commandment, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1995, at A4 (discussing the problems
with implementation of Christian religious instruction in state-supported schools in
England because of the religious and cultural diversity of the population); see also
Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law-Religion and State, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1613 (1987) [hereinafter Developments] (estimating over 1,200
different religious bodies in the United States). One commentator has noted that the
privatization of religion evolved in conjunction with pluralism, with England being the
only exception to the rule. See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Establishment: Reflections
on the English Experience, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 867, 878 (1991).
4' See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 44, § 21.2.
49 Much of the focus is on Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the primary
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lysts who look at the attitudes of the population during this period and
cite to the fact that the majority were Christian Protestants as evidence
that the United States was meant to be a Christian nation are invoking
faulty logic." The fact that a religion is shared by a majority of the
population does not automatically make it part of a nation's legal struc-
ture.
The most compelling reason why a purely historical analysis is
inappropriate in this case is that the world is a much different place than
it was 200 years ago. What may have been true in the late eighteenth
century is not necessarily binding on the nation today.' As in other
areas of law, one must look at the underlying need for a law before
deciding to adopt, reject, or revise it. 2 The majority of the population
at that time belonged to one of the many Protestant denominations, but
no denomination claimed to be the national religion.53 Arguably then, the
United States became a secular, or at least a disestablished, state at that
time.
54
drafters of the First Amendment. Even their later actions have been scrutinized to shed
light on their intentions at the Continental Congress and the subsequent adoption of the
Bill of Rights. This type of analysis is highly suspect in a legal sense because the
private beliefs of two individuals cannot define the laws of the state.
'0 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 157-58. As is often the case
with religious debates, people are apt to misquote history. For example, during the
period 1761-1800, more than one-third of the first births in New England occurred after
less than nine months of marriage, despite the existence of strict laws against fornica-
tion. See id. at 56; see also FINKE & STARKE, supra note 32, at 22. Therefore, the
United States was perhaps not as Christian in practice as religious activists now be-
lieve.
" See Robert S. Alley, Introduction, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
supra note 39, at 13, 15 (stating "[t]his is no game in which each side seeks to
uncover old quotes favorable to their cause; it is a confrontation over basic presupposi-
tions, a conflict between democracy and theocracy, both of which have deep roots in
our past.").
The dispute between a literal and a figurative reading of the Constitution is very
similar to the dispute between a literal and a figurative reading of religious texts. Nota-
bly, no one ever wins such disputes.
52 However, commentators are split as to whether contemporary public policy neces-
sitates or militates against the incorporation of religion into government.
S3 See FINKE & STARK, supra note 32, at 59-60.
4 One commentator noted that although there were religious fundamentalists during
the early days of the nation, they did not attack liberals or deists for their philosophies,
nor did they try to impose their own strict moral code on the nation through law. See
Henry Steele Commanger, Take Care of Me When I Am Dead, in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 331, 334.
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Experts differ on the extent of secularization in American govern-
ment throughout the years. Certainly some early state constitutions
recognized the importance of religious beliefs."5 Because the religion
clauses of the Constitution were initially held only to apply to the federal
government ("Congress shall make no law"), the states were free to allow
religion to play as large a role in government as their electorates desired.
Not until 1947, when the religion clauses were held by the Supreme
Court to be incorporated by the due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, did disestablishment become law on both the state and
federal levels. 6
The twentieth century has witnessed a tremendous increase in the
role of the federal government in all aspects of American life. 7 Recent-
ly, however, there has been a movement toward de-federalization by both
Congress and some members of the Supreme Court5 8 This move toward
de-federalization is occurring in all areas of government, from transporta-
tion and energy to education and abortion. The claim in the religious
arena is that by getting the federal government out of matters of local
concern, people can decide for themselves whether they want to live in
a Christian (or ostensibly, a Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, secular, etc.) commu-
nity. 9 The problem with this theory is that it denies certain property and
SS See Berman, supra note 40, at 780.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 7, 15 (1947) (applying the establish-
ment clause to states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the free
exercise clause to states). However, many of the states supported the strict separation
of religion and government even before they were forced to do so. See, e.g., KOSMI
& LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 78 (noting California's rejection of "sabbath laws" in
1872). Atheism is as much protected as any positive, theistic faith. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985).
' See CAPTER, supra note 2, at 138. The granting of tax subsidies and exemptions
has allowed the government to exert some power over religious bodies. See id. at 146,
150-55. Certainly this is a point to be considered, since the First Amendment limits not
only religious influence over government but also g9vernment's influence over religion.
"' See Goodstein, supra note 13; Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power; Close
Vote on Term Limit Shows Extent of Court's Division Over 'First Principles,' N.Y.
TvMEs, May 24, 1995, at Al. However, many in this movement fail to recognize that
the Constitution was created to cure the problems associated with excessive state sov-
ereignty. See Flaherty, supra note 44, at 547-48 (discussing the perceived failure of
republican politics and the need for increased federal protections). In demanding that
the states be given a high level of autonomy, these people forget that a federation of
virtually independent states was created under the Articles of Confederation - a system
that failed miserably and resulted in the current approach.
"' See Goodstein, supra note 13; Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1995, at 76, 76-80.
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First Amendment rights of minority groups.' People are forced to live
in ways that conform to others' religious beliefs, despite the fact that
religious liberty is a concept hat has been expressly removed from the
realm of popular electoral power.6 Because the violation of religious
freedoms not only abrogates people's basic human rights but, as shall be
seen, also leads inevitably to violence, such freedoms must be protect-
ed.62
60 One reason why many people do not recognize the dangers and inequities of
excessive local control is because they view it from the majority perspective. If,
however, a Christian family lived in a heavily Muslim area (something that is becom-
ing increasingly likely given the phenomenal rise of Islam in the United States) and
that community decided to implement a strict Islamic code regarding education,
morality, and penal law, then under this theory those Christians must abandon one of
two rights. They must either move into a community whose values were more to their
liking, thus forgoing their right to live in any area they wish, or be required to endure
various infringements on their religious and other freedoms. For example, children
might be forced to pray or silently bow during school prayers to Allah, and women
might be forced to conform to dress codes imposed for the sake of "public order and
morality," to borrow a phrase from the Irish constitution, or avoid working in certain
fields deemed inappropriate for females. As absurd as this may sound to some, by
replacing "Muslim" with "Christian," one can better understand the types of burdens
faced by non-Christians in American society. For a discussion of other minority rights
under international law, see Section IV, infra.
There is a second reason why total local control of such issues should not be
permitted. If communities are allowed to impose these sorts of moral codes within their
city boundaries, the United States will become a religiously segregated nation. American
history proves that racial segregation does not work and results in violence and
discontent; Irish history proves that religious segregation has the same effect. Therefore,
the United States should not impose upon itself a system guaranteed to splinter the
nation into factions.
62 In the past, it was considered very progressive to permit a person to hold his or
her own religious beliefs while still requiring adherence to the public religious rites of
the national religion. Today that view has been dismissed as infringing on individual
liberties, even in those nations that are closely aligned with a particular religion.
62 Certain aspects of this argument have been adopted by religious activists who
favor incorporating religion into government. Their position is that when religion is not
allowed to influence government, their rights are trampled. However, the separation of
church and state does not infringe on a person's belief or his or her own behavior, it
only prohibits the government from taking certain action. Laws that are devoid of
religion are very different than laws that are anti-religious. The latter type generally in-
cludes some affirmative repression, such as that which exists in China or existed in the
former Soviet Union. Freedom of religion should be considered a negative right
protecting one from interference, rather than a positive right permitting one to affirma-
tively impose one's values on others.
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Various enactments have been used to increase the role of religion
in American society. For example, presidential proclamations have con-
tained religious overtones since the time of George Washington. 3 More
recently, both President Reagan and President Bush recognized the
"Judeo-Christian" history of the nation by proclaiming 1983 to be the
"Year of the Bible' " and 1990 to be the "International Year of Bible
Reading." Both of these acts were litigated as being in violation of the
religion clauses, but were found not to be "laws" and therefore not un-
constitutional.'
' See James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS
LmERTY, supra note 39, at 89, 93; Wallace, supra note 2, at 1232. Even then, there
were those, including James Madison himself, who disagreed with the practice.
Madison, supra note 39, at 93 (objecting to presidential proclamations of a religious
nature because they "imply and certainly nourish the erroneous idea of a national
religion" and because of "the tendency of the practice, to narrow the recommendation
to the standard of the predominant sect"); see also Wallace, supra note 2, at 1250.
" The Presidential Proclamation contained various historical inaccuracies with respect
to the origins of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. See Proclamation
No. 5018, 48 Fed. Reg. 5527 (1983); see also Year of the Bible-Designation, Pub. L.
No. 97-280, 96 Stat. 1211 (1982) (stating that "the Bible, the Word of God, has made
a unique contribution in shaping the United States as a distinctive and blessed nation
and people;" that "Biblical teachings inspired concepts of civil government that are con-
tained in our Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States;"
and that "renewing our knowledge of and faith in God through Holy Scripture can
strengthen us as a nation and a people"); Robert F. Kane & Fred M. Blum, The
International Year of Bible Reading - The Unconstitutional Use of the Political
Process to Endorse Religion, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 333, 343 n.27 (1991).
's Presidential Proclamation 6100, which was issued on February 22, 1990, stated
that "our moral tradition has been shaped by the laws and teachings it contains. It was
a biblical view of man . . . that inspired the principles upon which the United States
is founded." Proclamation No. 6100, 55 Fed. Reg. 6783 (1990); see also Pub. L. No.
101-209, 103 Stat. 1838 (1989) (naming 1990 as the International Year of Bible
reading and stating that "the Bible has made a unique contribution in shaping the
United States as a distinctive and blessed nation and people"). The Proclamation also
said that "[w]hen you have read the Bible you will know that it is the Word of God,
because you will have found it the key to your own heart, your own happiness, and
your own duty." Proclamation No. 6100, supra. President Bush was apparently unaware
of any non-Christians who might disagree with his interpretation. See, e.g., People ex
rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 92 N.E. 251, 255 (Ill. 1910), quoted in Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 282 n.58 (1963) (stating that "[t]he Bible,
in its entirety, is a sectarian book as to the Jew and every believer in any religion
other than the Christian religion.'.
' See Zwerling v. Reagan, 576 F. Supp. 1373, 1376-78 (C.D. Cal. 1983); see Kane
& Blum, supra note 64, at 343 n.27. Some commentators still believe the Proclama-
tions to be unconstitutional. See id. at 343-46.
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Republicans are not the only ones invoking God in the name of
politics. During the 1992 election, candidates from both parties used a
tremendous amount of religious rhetoric.67 Jimmy Carter, a Democrat and
professed born-again Christian, often mentioned his personal faith, though
he did not attempt to implement it through law during his term as Presi-
dent.' In addition, President Clinton has continued the celebration of
National Prayer Day by presidential proclamation.69 The sole defense of
National Prayer Day is its non-sectarian nature; still, it does seem to
encourage religion in general and to bring state and religion closer than
some would like.7"
However, presidential proclamations are not the only type of reli-
giously influenced enactments that exist at the federal level. Proposed
constitutional amendments promoting freedom of religion and school
prayer have been bandied about for several years.7' In addition, in the
past fifteen years an increasing amount of religious legislation has been
proposed by Congress.' Although some consider these proposals to be
mere attempts by legislators to cozy up to their constituents, others see
them as illustrating the success of the religious right in getting its issues
to the table, something that is noteworthy in and of itself.3 Not only did
the religious lobbyists get their agenda considered in its own right, they
also shaped other types of legislation to achieve results more acceptable
to them.74 Also, once legislators begin to openly consider various reli-
gious issues, they become less controversial; the mere fact that the issues
are in the public realm dignifies them so that fewer people will question
their right to be in the public forum at all.75
67 See KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 158-66.
68 See MOEN, supra note 15, at 14.
' See Laurie Goodstein, U.S. Prayer Day Takes on More Political Tone: Backers
Turn Up Heat as School Law Debate Nears, May 4, 1995, WASH. POST, at A3 (noting
that the celebration began in 1952 by a joint resolution of Congress and that over forty
state capitals participated at the local level).
7 See id.; see also Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
603 n.52 (1989) (noting the possible unconstitutionality of a National Day of Prayer in
dicta).
71 See Laurie Goodstein, Religious Freedom Amendment Pressed, WASH. POST, June
9, 1995, at A12; Katharine Q. Seelye, Amendment on Prayers is Introduced, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A22.
' See MOEN, supra note 15, at 108-09, 129, 141-45. The "Contract With the Fam-
ily" introduced by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich demonstrated the extent to
which the religious right influences Congress. Goodstein, supra note 13.
' See MOEN, supra note 15, at 129.
74 See id. at 65-66.
75 See NEUHAUS, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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Although the scope of this Article prohibits a survey of state and
local legislation, there are those who believe the greatest successes of
religious activists in the 1990s have been their grassroots campaigns at
the state and local level.76 Election of religious activists to local legisla-
tures has spawned a variety of morality legislation, and although some of
these bills have been thwarted or at least slowed by litigation questioning
their constitutionality,.7 they are again proving the strength of the reli-
gious electorate and legitimating the politicization of moral issues.78
Much of American constitutional law is found not in the Constitution
itself, but in the decisions of the Supreme Court. Despite claims that
Article I judges, and Supreme Court justices in particular, are exempt
from political and popular control, their decisions are often accurate
reflections of their times.79 This may be because federal judges and
justices are appointed by the President, a political, popularly elected
official who often places only those with viewpoints similar to his or her
own on the bench.
The Supreme Court has a mixed history in recognizing religious
precepts as a part of the legal history of the United States. On the one
hand, the Supreme Court has noted that "this is a Christian nation."8 On
the other hand, it has steadfastly refused to uphold laws which "aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'" The key
76 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 27. For example, 1990 was pro-
claimed the International Year of Bible Reading in at least thirty-six states. See Kane
& Blum, supra note 64, at 340 n.19.
7 Much of the legislation has centered on limitations to abortion and gay rights.
The defensive posture now taken by liberal religious organizations and by
separationists only strengthens many religious activists' resolve, since they can then
target a tangible "enemy" to fight against in what they perceive as a holy war. How-
ever, the rhetorical and psychological value of being perceived as an oppressed minority
will disappear if and when the religious right becomes an accepted and legitimate
influence in American politics.
' The federal judiciary may not be accountable to the public, but they very seldom
hand down decisions that are radically different from the public sentiment, especially
on highly controversial issues. Of course, there are well-known exceptions to the rule.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
'0 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (Brewer J.); see
also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,
625 (1931) (noting that "[w]e are a Christian People").
8, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 7, 15 (1947). There are a variety of
judicial tests used to determine whether the state has acted unconstitutionally with
regard to religion. One of the most popular under the Establishment Clause is the
endorsement test, enunciated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch
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to interpreting these seemingly contradictory decisions is to understand
that the Supreme Court, like other public institutions, reflects the cultural
tenor of the times; the rhetoric of the Supreme Court changes in accor-
dance with the type of case it is deciding and with the author of the
opinion; and the actual decisions of the Court have been moving toward
a more liberal, i.e., separationist, position, although that trend may be
slowing.
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). O'Connor would permit the state to display
explicit religious symbols if the larger setting negated any endorsement of the religious
content of the symbol. Id. at 690-95; see Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 633-35
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
An earlier Establishment Clause test that was highly influential in shaping First
Amendment jurisprudence, but which is now dropping out of favor is the Lemon test.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Lemon test prohibits govern-
ment action that (i) has no secular purpose, (ii) has the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, or (iii) fosters an excessive entanglement between the state and reli-
gion. See id.; see also Wallace, supra note 2, at 1207 (noting the test's continuing
validity despite criticism by individual justices).
A third Establishment Clause test which has had only limited application is the
Marsh test. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the court allowed the
practice of beginning a legislative session with prayer to stand based on its historical
status. Id. at 786. The reasoning in Marsh has not generated any following among
Supreme Court justices.
The most recent Establishment Clause approach is the coercion test found in
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-62 (1989) (plurality opinion). Essentially, under
this test the state may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or
give direct benefits to a religion so as to create an established religion. Id. at 659.
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is equally awkward. See Underkuffler-Freund,
supra note 20, at 851-58. Early tests differentiated between religious beliefs and
religious practices. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-05 (1961); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940). Religious beliefs are absolutely protected,
while religious actions are only protected if they are (i) required by a central religious
belief, (ii) are substantially burdened by state action, and (iii) do not outweigh a
compelling governmental interest. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); see also Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 851. Over the
years, the test has essentially collapsed so that the third prong is solely determinative
of the constitutionality of the act. See id. at 853. Virtually any state action can and
will be found compelling under this test. See id. at 854-56; see also Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988); Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 216-17. Legislative
discontent with the outcome of Smith led to the passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (Supp. 1993); Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 437, 438 (1994).
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B. An Overview of Irish History
In order to properly compare Irish and American approaches to law
and religion, one must understand something of the Irish history and
people. Unlike the United States, Ireland is an ancient land whose history
predates Christianity." Politically, the native Irish were divided into
individual kingdoms throughout the first millennium,' which allowed the
Normans to invade in the twelfth century, a move which only increased
the political heterogeneity of the island.84 However, Christianity, which
had long been a part of the political, legal, and social atmosphere of Ire-
land,' provided a unifying effect in spite of this political fragmenta-
tion.' Although the native Irish made various attempts to expel the
invaders and unite the island under local rule, they were unsuccessful, and
Britain has remained a force in Irish government until the present day,
though now limited to Northern IrelandY
Critical to an understanding of the nation is an understanding of
government policy toward the faith of the people.88 In fact, religion can
be said to be the single most important element of Irish history because
it often dictated official policies regarding both penal and property law.
For years, religion was considered an important but uneventful part of
' See FJ. Byrne, Early Irish Society, in THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY 43, 43
(T.W. Moody & F.X. Martin eds., 1967); Donnchadh 6 Corrin, Prehistoric and Early
Christian Ireland, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF IRELAND 1, 1 (R.F. Foster ed., 1989).
See Brian 0 Cuiv, Ireland in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, in THE
COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note 82, at 107, 113. Subsequent battles over the
high kingship further divided the country. See id. at 121.
" See F.X. Martin, The Normans: Arrival and Settlement, in THE COURSE OF IRISH
HISTORY, supra note 82, at 123, 143. One commentator noted that it was the partial
conquest of Ireland that has led to its present-day problems. See id.
8 See Tomds Cardinal 6 Fiaich, The Beginnings of Christianity (5th and 6th Cen-
turies), in THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note 82, at 61, 61. Although the
Christian missionary, St. Patrick, certainly had a tremendous influence on converting the
Irish, Christianity in Ireland pre-dates his arrival, and indeed goes back to the fifth
century A.D. See id. at 61-64.
See Byme, supra note 82, at 59-60; Cuiv, supra note 83, at 113.
See Katherine Simms, The Norman Invasion and the Gaelic Recovery, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF IRELAND, supra note 82, at 44, 67.
' The struggle over land and religion came to a peak in the sixteenth century,
when the rise of nationalism and Protestantism led King Henry VIII to initiate an
aggressive policy of imperial expansion into Ireland. See G.A. Hayes-McCoy, The Tudor
Conquest, in THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note 82, at 174, 174-75; see also
Nicholas Canny, Early Modem Ireland c. 1500-1700, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
IRELAND, supra note 82, at 88, 103.
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Irish life. For example, Ireland remained staunchly Catholic throughout
the period of the Continental Reformation. However, trouble began when
Protestantism was brought to the island through the policies of Henry
VIII and his immediate successors. "9 At first, Protestantization took the
shape of the declaration of the English monarch as head of the Church of
Ireland and the closure of the Roman Catholic monasteries. 90 Britain then
attempted to convert the Irish through legislation, but those efforts also
failed.9' The only method that made any impact on the demographic
makeup of the island was the policy of plantation, i.e., the dispossession
of Catholic landholders and the granting of those lands to Protestant
English colonists.' The policy of plantation in the north during the early
1600s changed the religious and social aspects of Ulster so radically that
differences remain to this day.9' Political conflict in Ireland became
religiously charged early on, as Protestantism became associated with the
English conquerors and the ruling classes, while Catholicism became
tinged with nationalistic aspirations.94
Catholics in Ireland were plagued for the next several hundred years
by a number of discriminatory laws that favored Protestants over Catho-
lics.9" Over the years, the vicissitudes of politics and governments
changed, but eventually barriers to Catholic participation in commerce and
' See Hayes-McCoy, supra note 88, at 180-81 (noting that Continental Protestantism
had few followers in Ireland at the time of Henry VIll's break with Rome, but English
domestic policy required religious conformity within all of Britain). Henry and his
daughter Elizabeth I were the most successful of the Tudors in implementing the new
Protestantism, but even they were unable to create widespread religious conformity. See
id. at 181-83.
90 See id. at 180.
9, See id. at 180-81.
9 See id. at 183.
"I See RiCHARD ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE
247 (1971); see also Aidan Clarke, The Colonisation of Ulster and the Rebellion of
1641, in THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note 82, at 189, 190-93.
9' See Hayes-McCoy, supra note 88, at 181; see also Clarke, supra note 93, at 194
(recognizing the existence of loyalist Catholics in Ireland).
9 See, e.g., Maureen Wall, The Age of the Penal Laws, in THE COURSE OF IRISH
HISTORY, supra note 82, at 217, 218-19, 231 (noting how the first relaxation in
discriminatory laws eventually led to agitation for an Irish Free State). However, the
sporadic enforcement of the anti-Catholic laws may have contributed to the continued
existence of the faith, while simultaneously bolstering anti-English fervor. See id. at
218. It was also unusual that the discriminated-against religious sect constituted a
majority of the population. See id.
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government were swept away."' However, it was the combined energies
of religion and nationalism that brought about an independent Ireland.'
On December 6, 1921, after years of both political and military
agitation, the south of Ireland was granted dominion status within the
British empire, and the new Irish Free State was given self-governance of
its internal affairsO8 In this way, Ireland is similar to the United States
in that both gained independence from Britain after somewhat violent rev-
olution. Interestingly, the 1922 Constitution was less religious and more
nonsectarian than the current constitution. For example, Article 8 of the
1922 Constitution prohibited the direct or. indirect endowment of any
religion, any restrictions on the free exercise of religion, and preferences
or discrimination on account of religion. 9 There were no other referenc-
es to religion in the 1922 Constitution."° However, the reality was that
the acts of the legislature reflected the overwhelmingly Catholic perspec-
tive of the electorate (approximately ninety percent of the population was
" See, e.g., R.B. McDowell, The Protestant Nation, in THE COURSE OF IRISH
HISTORY, supra note 82, at 232, 241.
- See David Fitzpatrick, Ireland Since 1870, in THE OxFORD HISTORY OF IRELAND,
supra note 82, at 174, 182; G.W. Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in
Ireland From Independence to the Present Day, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 47, 55 (1987);
Patrick Lynch, The Irish Free State and the Republic of Ireland, in THE COURSE OF
IRISH HISTORY, supra note 82, at 324, 331; Donald McCartney, From Parnell to
Pearse, in THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note 82, at 294, 311-12.
' See Lynch, supra note 97, at 326. The Irish Free State implemented its first
Constitution in 1922.
The six counties which now comprise Northern Ireland were retained as a part of
Britain. Historically, the six counties of Ulster were politically, religiously, and in
almost all other ways demographically different than the rest of Ireland. See Clarke,
supra note 93, at 192, 203. However, many of those in the South have adopted an
idealogy that perceives all persons living in Ireland to be part of the Irish nation,
regardless of their religious background. See Hogan, supra note 97, at 48. Northern
Unionists do not share this belief, and with good reason, since a number of actions
taken by the Irish government reinforce the Catholic-Gaelic aspects of the nation at the
cost of shared Catholic-Protestant traits. See id. The effect is similar to that found in
Israel, where the concerns and values of Arab citizens are marginalized to emphasize
the Jewish character of the state. See Erik Cohen, Citizenship, Nationality and Religion
in Israel and Thailand, in THE ISRAELI STATE AND SOCIETY: BOUNDARIES AND FRON-
TIERS 66, 70-74 (Baruch Kimmerling ed., 1989); see also Christopher A. Callanan,
Note, Does Peace Have A Chance? Protection of Individual Rights as the Foundation
for Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 87, 97-98 (1995).
'9 See Hogan, supra note 97, at 50.
' See id. In contrast, the Bunreacht na l~ireann contains a number of explicit ref-
erences to Christianity and Catholicism.
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Catholic) by upholding clerical perspectives on issues of law and morali-
ty.
101
In 1931, the British empire became an association of self-governing
states, which increased Ireland's claims of sovereignty. In 1937, Ireland
adopted its present constitution, called the Bunreacht na hEireann, which
declared Ireland to be a "sovereign, independent, democratic state. ' '1
Although this instrument may or may not have taken Ireland out of the
commonwealth, Ireland ceased acting as a commonwealth country, and in
1949, the British government officially recognized the Republic of Ireland
(hereinafter "Ireland") as an independent nation. 3
In 1973, Ireland became a member of the European Community
(now the European Union).' 4 Some feel that the entry into the Europe-
an Union has had a liberalizing effect on the population and government
of the staunchly and conservatively Catholic state." Others note, how-
101 See id.
M IR. CONST. art. 5. This document was unusual in its explicit acknowledgement of
natural law as its foundation. JAMEs CASEY, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW iN IRELAND vii
(1992). The structure of government is similar to that of the United States and of
Britain - a division of powers between judicial, legislative, and executive branches of
government, where the courts are given the critical role of judicial review of the acts
of the other two bodies. See id. at 24. Although Ireland has a president, it is a non-
political position that is more similar to the role of the monarch in Britain than that
of the American president. See ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 56-59. The true head of the
state in Ireland, as in Britain, is the prime minister.
03 See Lynch, supra note 97, at 331. Britain retained control and jurisdiction over
Northern Ireland.
"0 See J.H. Whyte, Ireland, 1966-82, in THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note
82, at 359, 359. The Constitution Act of 1972, which formalized Ireland's entry into
the European Community, included several other amendments, the most important of
which revoked the "special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church
as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens." CASEY,
supra note 102, at 23 (quoting IR. CONST. art. 44.1(2) (repealed 1972)). The removal
of this provision was required prior to Ireland's entry into the European Community.
See id.
105 See Colin T6ibn, Letter From Ireland: Dublin's Epiphany, NEW YORKER, Apr.
3, 1995, at 45, 48. Ireland is similar to the United States in its struggle to find a
religio-political compromise between the demands of a liberal federalist superstructure
and the demands of a more conservative local government. In the United States, de-
federalization is returning power to local bodies, while in the European Union there is
a move towards greater unification in many areas. See also Asbjorn Eide, Minority
Situations: In Search of Peaceful and Constructive Solutions, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1311, 1349 (1991) (referring to Professor Gabriel Moens' statement that the creation of
super-national legal systems like the European Union is the best way to protect minori-
ties). The trend in Europe could be analogized to the shift made in the United States
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ever, that the Maastricht Treaty, which Ireland signed in 1992, may
increase Ireland's ability to legislate in matters of domestic concern."
One of the most pressing political concerns now facing Ireland is the
possibility of making Northern Ireland part of the Republic. The reunifi-
cation of Ireland has been a goal of many Irish Catholics for over
seventy years and is reflected by Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution
which state that "the national territory consists of the whole island" and
define the jurisdictional reach of the laws of Ireland "pending the re-
integration of the national territory."'" Both Britain and the Protestant
residents of Ulster have resisted unification for years, citing the possibility
of discrimination against Protestants under Catholic rule."3 However,
historic negotiations between Britain and Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist
party, have taken place throughout 1995 and 1996, though no agreement
is yet in sight.
Today, the vast majority of Irish citizens are Roman Catholics."°
Although Catholicism no longer holds a "special position" in the constitu-
tion or officially in the common law, its presence is nevertheless felt
throughout the law and culture of the Republic. This is particularly true
in rural areas, which, like rural areas in the United States, are more
conservative than urban areas."' However, the future of the Catholic
church in Irish politics remains to be seen, as Ireland struggles not only
with the conflicting requirements of the European Union, but also with
towards greater centralization after the Articles of Confederation failed to create a
workable union.
06 See IR. CONST. amend. 11; Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, A Not So Dis-
tant Mirror: Federalism and the Role of Natural Law in the United States, the Re-
public of Ireland, and the European Community, 25 VANED. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 429,
444 (1992).
,07 IR. CONST. arts. 2-3.
" See J.L. McCracken, Northern Ireland, 1921-66, in THE COURSE OF IRISH
HISTORY, supra note 82, at 313, 313.
,09 See Whyte, supra note 104, at 342, 354. The author of a 1981 sociological
survey noted that "The first impression ... is that Ireland remains an outstandingly
religious country .. .. Irish people [are] far more inclined to religion than those of
other countries in Europe." CASEY, supra note 102, at 553 (quoting Professor Michael
Fogarty). In this regard, Ireland is very much like the United States, which has always
been described as a very devout nation. Although the population of Northern Ireland
is predominantly Protestant, the number of Catholics there is rising. See Whyte, supra
note 104, at 342-43, 354.
,,0 See Hogan, supra note 97, passim. In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitutional provision regarding the "special position" of the Catholic church had no
juridical significance. See Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Attorney General [1972] 1 I.R.
1, 23-24; see also CASEY, supra note 102, at 556.
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the potential reunification with the Protestant North."' As Ireland faces
these important issues, it must reconsider its traditional treatment of law
and religion. Like the United States, Ireland is undergoing a religio-legal
crisis, but in reverse. Whereas the United States is reconsidering the
secular nature of its legal system, Ireland is facing challenges to the
religious nature of its legal system. Each nation can learn from the other
as it tries to find a solution to a very difficult problem.
mT1. THE CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED
A. Sovereignty and Constitutional Interpretation
The first area of comparative analysis concerns national sovereignty
and general constitutional interpretation. It is important to identify the
theoretical bases that support a nation's concept of sovereignty because
such bases will invariably influence the boundaries of judicial review. For
example, Iran considers its national sovereignty to be directly derived
from Allah, and relates that belief to its role as an Islamic state.112 It is,
therefore, not surprising that the Iranian Constitution requires that all
laws, and implicitly the judicial interpretation of those laws, be "in
conformity with Islamic criteria."
'
"
3
Similarly, the parameters of general constitutional principles, includ-
ing those of judicial interpretation, are important to any subsequent
analysis of specific constitutional provisions. Without understanding the
larger legal infrastructure, it is impossible to understand the individual
laws and judicial opinions." 4
. See generally Thomas W. Lippman, British, IRA Officials Confer Here: U.S.-
Sponsored Meeting Provides Cautious Step Toward Peace, WASH. POST, May 25, 1995,
at A27 (stating the aim of the conference is to promote Northern Ireland as an
economic gateway to the European market). Although some commentators believe that
the influence of the Catholic church may be waning, see Whyte, supra note 104, at
354, others believe that the church's clout remains high, see CASEY, supra note 102,
at 555-56.
112 See IRAN CONST. preamble, arts. 1-2, 56, cited in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 45.
"i3 See, e.g., id. arts. 3, 20, 28.
"4 Because both Ireland and the United States are common law jurisdictions, judicial
decisions are as important as legislatively enacted laws. However, although it was
constitutionally permitted since the creation of the new state, American-style judicial
review did not really begin to flourish in Ireland until the 1960s. See CASEY, supra
note 102, at 24.
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1. Ireland
Sovereignty, according to Article 6 of the Irish Constitution, is
derived "under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the
rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national
policy.""' 5 Some commentators have remarked that Irish constitutional
law, as embodied in the Constitution and interpreted by the judiciary, is
a leading example of natural law, wherein the purpose of the state is to
"move society closer to God's eternal law through the definition of
justice."" 6 This approach is consistent with the approach first outlined
by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century." '7 Although Ireland is
considered nominally secular,"' it encompasses a strongly homogenous
religious population that does not necessarily support an official sepa-
ration of church and state."9 Only recently has Ireland distanced itself
from an explicit affiliation with the Roman Catholic church."
If the Christian nature of Ireland is not immediately apparent in the
nation's culture, it is in the Constitution, which begins:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must
be referred,
"" IRt. CONST. art. 6(1).
116 Butler & Gregory, supra note 106, at 446.
'" See id.; see also Aquinas, supra note 7, at 46-48. The Thomistic approach to
law has traditionally been favored by the Catholic church. See BARRIE RUTH STRAUSS,
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: A CONCISE HISTORY 79 (1992). Some note that the emer-
gence of a similar approach by the conservative activists of the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Butler & Gregory, supra note 106, at 436-37. However, the current Bishop of
Limerick sees the recent religio-political debate as a battle between the views of
Thomas Aquinas and John Stuart Mill. See ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 173.
"1 See IR. CONST. art. 44(2) (prohibiting the "endowment" of religion).
"1 See Butler & Gregory, supra note 106, at 432 (describing Irish church-state
relations as a "tradition of synergy, rather than separation"); see also CASEY, supra
note 102, at 555 (quoting Professor Whyte as saying, "[w]hile it would be an exagger-
ation to call Ireland a theocratic state, the [Catholic] hierarchy had immense influence").
'2° See Hogan, supra note 97, at 66-67. At one point during the drafting of the
Bunreacht na lhireann, some made the suggestion that the Catholic church should
receive exclusive recognition in the Constitution. See id. at 55. However, the actual
document also recognized the rights of other religions in Ireland, including that of "the
Jewish congregations," which was particularly progressive in the Europe of 1937.
ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 29; see also CASEY, supra note 102, at 23 n.80 (quoting
original language).
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We, the people of Eire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord,
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial,...
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution."'
This recognition of the Christian character of the state, while not limiting
the benefits of the state to persons who adhere to Christian beliefs,"z
demonstrates the intent of the authors of the Constitution to incorporate
religion into the legal system." One of the leading cases on privacy
rights, Norris v. Attorney General, notes that:
The preamble to the Constitution proudly asserts the existence of God
in the Most Holy Trinity and recites that the people of Ireland humbly
acknowledge their obligation to 'our Divine Lord Jesus Christ.' It cannot
be doubted that a people . . . were proclaiming a deep religious convic-
tion and faith and an intention to adopt a Constitution consistent with
that conviction and faith and with Christian beliefs.1
24
However, the dissent was not swayed by the argument that the
Christian nature of the nation should be dispositive." The dissent also
objected to the majority's use of historical analysis in constitutional
interpretation."2
In accordance with the framers' intent, both the legislature and the
judiciary have drawn upon the Catholic heritage of the nation in design-
ing and interpreting the law. For example, in 1965 the Court referred to
the 1962 Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul XXIII in construing Article
40 of the Constitution. 27 In addition, the Constitution cites God as the
ultimate source of governmental legitimacy, echoing Catholic political
dogma as defined by St. Augustine." Although some classical liberals
121 IR. CONST. preamble. The religious tone of the preamble is more pronounced in
the Bunreacht na hf ireann than in the 1922 Constitution. See CASEY, supra note 102,
at 21.
" See Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Attorney General [1972] 1 I.R. 1, 23 (Walsh,
J.); see also CASEY, supra note 102, at 556.
123 See CASEY, supra note 102, at 29, 556.
124 Norris v. Attorney General [1984] 1 I.R. 36, 64 (O'Higgins, CJ.); see also
CASEY, supra note 102, at 556.
" See [1984] 1 I.R. at 72 (Henchy, J., dissenting); Hogan, supra note 97, 'at 80.
126 [1984] 1 I.R. at 96 (McCarthy, J., dissenting); Hogan, supra note 97, at 79, 79
n.84 (noting that the historical approach had earlier been rejected by the Supreme
Court); cf Flaherty, supra note 44, at 524-25 (noting a significant use of historical
analysis in American constitutional law).
" See Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] 1 I.R. 294, 314; Butler & Gregory, supra
note 106, at 453.
128 See IR. CONST. art. 6(1); see also Butler & Gregory, supra note 106, at 445
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might be uncomfortable with this type of decision-making, such opinions
could be constitutionally defended on the grounds that Ireland has the
right to develop its legal system "in accordance with its own genius and
tradition."'
129
Ireland also refers implicitly to the Catholic culture in its conditional
granting of certain rights. For example, citizens may freely express their
opinions, but no one may do so to "undermine public order or morali-
ty."'3° Putting conditions on rights that should be virtually absolute is a
dangerous business. Many Middle Eastern states have included similar
provisions in their constitutions, i.e., requiring rights to be exercised in
conformity with Islamic principles, which has resulted in an oppressive
political atmosphere that ensures the continuation of the party in power
because any dissent can be interpreted as "undermining public order or
morality."'.. As long as "public order and morality" require residents to
conform to the status quo, change is virtually impossible.,
2
Other constitutional provisions help support the existing religio-
political structure. For example, the Constitution contains prohibitions on
blasphemy' and the publication of "indecent matter.' '34 As is the
case in the Middle East, these limitations on speech can be used to
n.54.
'29 IR. CONST. art. 1.
'3o Id. art. 40(6)(1)(i).
" Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cul-
tures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 317, 341-42 (1994).
3 Professor Hogan of Trinity College, Dublin, has asked whether, "if the personal
rights contained in Article 40 are those which follow from the Christian and democratic
nature of the State, does it follow that conduct which is at variance with Christian
teaching cannot fall within the confines of Article 40, and thus be protected against
legislative encroachment?" Hogan, supra note 97, at 65 (discussing Ryan v. Attorney
General [1965] 1 I.R. 294, 313-14 (Kenny, J.)). He believed the issue was still in the
process of resolution. However, the embeddedness of the Catholic hierarchy in the
political and social order virtually guarantees an organized and powerful resistance to
any change toward secularism or liberalism.
3 See IR. CONST. art. 40(6)(1)(i). The North American colonies also had funda-
mental laws prohibiting blasphemy, but those laws have for the most part disappeared.
See Berman, supra note 40, at 780-81 (citing the conviction for blasphemy in New
York in 1811 and in Pennsylvania in 1822).
13 IR. CONST. art. 40(6)(1)(i); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957) (holding that obscenity is not a constitutionally protected form of speech or
press); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words" are not
protected by the Constitution); cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (noting
that "obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment").
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enforce an ever-increasing code of religious morality. Although Ireland is
currently a more open society than most Middle Eastern nations, perhaps
due to the liberalizing effects of membership in the European Union,
these restrictions were used quite frequently in the early days of the
nation to censor books and other informational materials. 35 Censorship,
though declining, still exists in Ireland, and has most recently been aimed
at materials regarding the availability of abortion in England.'
36
The general importance of religion in Irish life is found in the
provisions of Article 44 of the Constitution, where "[t]he State ac-
knowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God.
It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour reli-
gion."'37 Although freedom of religion is guaranteed under this provi-
sion, it is again made subject to "public order and morality," thus casting
doubt on the extent of the freedom. 3 However, the Constitution prohib-
its the endowment of any particular religion,39 and the Supreme Court
has held that the state may not discriminate against or in favor of any
religion."4 Nevertheless, these protections seem somewhat disingenuous
in light of the religious homogeneity of the nation and the de facto
135 See Hogan, supra note 97, at 63-65; Lynch, supra note 97, at 338-39; Whyte,
supra note 104, at 354. Leaving the definition of "indecency" open to subjective
interpretation allows for massive abuse should a government bent on censorship come
into power.
3
-
'3 See James F. Clarity, Ireland's Senate Debates Information on Abortion, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 13, 1995, at A2; see also T6ibin, supra note 105, at 53. Literature
regarding other forms of birth control was banned until 1973. See id. at 48. The
Censorship Board still exists and can ban books for up to twelve years. See ARDAGH,
supra note 17, at 239-40. Although these measures may seem archaic to some, the
abortion services "gag order" imposed by Presidents Reagan and Bush during the 1980s
and early 1990s could be considered a similar form of censorship, in that federally
supported health care providers were prohibited from providing patients with information
about any facility that performed abortions, even if that facility also offered pre-natal
care.
'3 IR. CONST. art. 44(1).
,38 Id. art 44(2)(1). It is particularly disturbing that a provision guaranteeing freedom
of religion would restrict that freedom on the grounds of morality. Such language could
be used to legitimize any eventual limitation of non-majority religious practices.
'39 Id. art. 44(2).
'" See Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Attorney General [1972] 1 I.R. 1; see also Ho-
gan, supra note 97, at 70-71. The term "religion" apparently includes atheism as well.
See Mulloy v. Minister for Education [1975] 1 I.R. 88 (construing Article 44(2)(3)); see
also CASEY, supra note 102, at 568. However, the Constitution mandates a generalized
religious test for certain high public officials. See IR. CONST. arts. 12(8), 34(5)(1)
(requiring the president and members of the judiciary to take an oath demonstrating
religious beliefs of any kind).
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influence exerted by the Catholic hierarchy over both the government and
the people. However, as will be seen in the discussion on education, the
state has made an effort to support both Catholicism and Protestantism
with some measure of equity. In addition, the Catholic church's slowly
waning power may bode well for minority groups wishing to increase
legal protection of their rights under international and European Union
law.
2. The United States
Although the American Declaration of Independence is not part of
the U.S. Constitution, it has been used both to justify and prohibit the
inclusion of Christianity in American government. For example, religious
activists point to the line basing the creation of the new sovereign nation
on "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."'' However, although
this phrase may be deist, it is only marginally so and is not in any way
Christian. The other well-known reference to a transcendent being comes
in the second paragraph of the document, wherein the drafters note that
"all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights . .,, ."" Again, this phrase, though deist,
does not require the conclusion that the founders intended this to be a
Christian nation in the same way that the Irish Constitution's founders
did. In fact, the express declaration regarding the source of sovereignty is
secular, not religious, stating "Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed ....
This recognition of sovereignty, like the Constitution's "We the Peo-
ple,"'" demonstrates an intent that the political legitimacy of the nation
be based upon a secular foundation.'4
Within the Constitution itself, there are very few references to
religion or God.'" Notably, the Constitution forbids the use of religious
,4, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
" Id. para. 2. The only other references to a supreme being are found in the final
paragraph, where the representatives of the new nation appeal to "the Supreme Judge
of the World for the rectitude of our Intentions," and "with a firm reliance on the
protection of divine Providence," pledge their support for the document. Id. at para. 32.
" Id. para. 2.
'44 U.S. CONST. preamble.
" See Richards, supra note 2, at 36; see also Flaherty, supra note 44, at 546-49
(discussing the tension between "liberal" and "republican" views during the founding
period).
'" However, in the 1950s religious activists put forth "a major effort to amend the
Constitution to provide that the laws of the United States were subject to the word of
God, and to the rule of God's Son Jesus Christ." CARTER, supra note 2, at 86.
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oaths or tests for high government office.'47 Only in the Bill of Rights
is any explicit mention of religion made, and then only fleetingly."
However, the American common law is replete with decisions discussing
the meaning of the religion clauses. Decisions range from Holy Trinity,
which recognized the "Christian nature" of the nation (though not neces-
sarily the law),'49 to Everson v. Board of Education, which prohibited
the government from "aid[ing] one religion, aid[ing] all religions, or
prefer[ing] one religion over another."' Because religion is not to be
part of American legal culture, the underlying philosophy of judicial
interpretation is to protect the free exercise of religion while simulta-
neously prohibiting its establishment. This dual function has led some
commentators to remark on the "schizophrenic" nature of American
jurisprudence in this area.'51
B. Personal Rights
1. Ireland
The area that is most reflective of religious values in a society or
legal system is that of personal rights and related issues (often called
"family law"). Ireland is no exception to the rule. The Irish Constitution
expressly states that:
The State recognizes the Family as the natural primary and funda-
mental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing
inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all
positive law.'52
Obviously, this effort failed. Note, however, the similarities between the construction of
the proposed amendment and the constitutional law of Ireland.
U.S. CONST. arts. II, §9, VI, § 3.
' Id. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ").
,49 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (Brewer, J.);
accord United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931) (noting that "[w]e are a
Christian People").
"m Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 7, 15 (1947); see supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
15, See generally Developments, supra note 47, at 1631-32; Underkuffler-Freund,
supra note 20, at 838; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)
(noting that the two religion clauses "are cast in absolute terms, and either, ... if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other").
52 IR. CONST. art. 41(1)(1).
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The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its consti-
tution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as
indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State."'
The primacy of the family in the Irish Constitution is consistent with
Catholic dogma, which states that "[tihe family is the original cell of
social life."' The term "family" has been held by the Supreme Court
to mean a family based on marriage.' Under this construction, unmar-
ried mothers are not of the same "family" as their children,' 6 which is
again consistent with Catholic belief."r
Irish women are predominantly defined in the Constitution by their
roles as mothers and homemakers. Two different provisions emphasize
women's roles as such. In the first, the State affirmatively "recognises
that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support
without which the common good cannot be achieved."'56 The second is
more protective in nature, noting that the government shall "endeavor to
ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage
in labor to the neglect of their duties in the home."'5 9 Although there
are no de jure prohibitions of women working outside the home, and
there are constitutional guarantees that "[a]ll citizens shall, as human per-
sons, be held equal before the law, ' ' "6 it is still possible that women
will be discriminated against in the workforce and under legal sanction.
First, the provision granting equality of legal status notes that "[tihis shall
not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due
regard to differences of capacity, both physical and moral, and of social
function."' 6 ' When women's primary constitutional role is that of mother
and homemaker, it is only a small step to finding that working outside
the home will conflict with women's "social function." Second, the state,
I3 Id. art. 41(1)(2).
254 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH I 2207 (First Image Books ed., 1995).
"The political community has a duty to honor the family, to assist it, and to ensure .
. . especially the freedom to establish a family, have children, and bring them up in
keeping with the family's own moral and religious convictions ... "' Id. 2211.
,' Murray v. Attorney General [1985] 1 I.R. 532; State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord
Uchtfla [1966] 1 I.R. 567; see also CASEY, supra note 102, at 494.
'" See G. v. An Bord Uchtfla [19801 1 I.R. 32, 554-55 (O'Higgins, CJ., dissenting)
(in dicta); CASEY, supra note 102, at 494.
'57 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 154, J[ 2202.
158 IR. CONST. art. 41(2)(1); see John Tagliabue, John Paul Reaches Out in Holy
Rites - Features Women and Non-Catholics, N.Y. TIES, Apr. 16, 1995, at A10.
'9 IR. CONST. art. 41(2)(2).
'6 Id. art. 40(1).
161 Id.
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through its health and safety powers, may regulate women's careers to the
extent that no one shall be "forced by economic necessity to enter
avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength."'"2 This paternalistic
attitude is very similar to that advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the early 1900s.63 Although some commentators believe that the pro-
visions limiting women's roles outside the home do not provide a foun-
dation for legislative restrictions on women's careers," no cases have
yet come before the Supreme Court that support that assumption."
Irish women are also forbidden the right to control their own bodies.
Unsurprisingly, given the Catholic majority, abortion is illegal in Ireland.
The Constitution states that "the State acknowledges the right to life of
the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to
defend and vindicate that right."'" Although the Constitution acknowl-
edges the government's duty to "defend and vindicate the personal rights
of the citizen,"' 67 those rights are limited when it comes to abortion.
Because Ireland recognizes the "equal right to life of the unborn," there
are very few instances where abortion is permitted.'68 The current test
for obtaining an abortion in Ireland is "if it is established as a matter of
162 Id. art. 45(4)(2).
161 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908); see also Bunting v. Oregon,
243 U.S. 426 (1916); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
164 See CASEY, supra note 102, at 522. But cf. ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 205-06
(noting recent legal obstacles to women in the work force, including a law forcing
women in civil service to resign upon marriage; such law was repealed in 1977).
165 The fact that the provisions remain in the Constitution indicates that they could
be used to limit women's opportunities. Just because they have not yet been used in
that manner does not mean they never will be. As Ireland's own history shows, once
a discriminatory law is on the books, enforcement of the provision often depends on
the political, social, and cultural whims of the authorities. See Wall, supra note 95, at
218.
66 IR. CONST. art. 40(3)(3); see also Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 §§ 58-
59, No. 100 (1861) (making it a crime to administer, procure drugs, or use instruments
to procure an abortion); Hogan, supra note 97, at 75-76. Abortion has traditionally been
prohibited by the Catholic church. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra
note 154, 9M 2270-75 (dictating that life begins at conception).
167 IR. CONST. art. 40(3)(1).
" There is a wealth of legal commentary on the subject of abortion in Ireland. See,
e.g., David Cole, "Going to England": Irish Abortion Law and the European Communi-
ty, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 113 (1993); Anne M. Hilbert, The Irish
Abortion Debate: Substantive Rights and Affecting Commerce Jurisprudential Models, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117 (1994); Jeffrey A. Weinstein, Comment, "An Irish
Solution to An Irish Problem": Ireland's Struggle with Abortion Law, 10 ARIz. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 165 (1993).
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probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct
from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the ter-
mination of her pregnancy.'. 69 However, the term "risk" does not re-
quire an "inevitable or immediate risk to the life of the mother."'7
Under this test, abortion is illegal even in cases of rape. Long-term ef-
fects regarding the health of the mother are also irrelevant.
Although it is very difficult to obtain an abortion in Ireland, women
have the right to obtain abortions in other European Union Member
States. The landmark case that led to the expansion of the abortion laws
to the current level and inspired the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution prohibiting any restrictions on the freedom to trav-
el '7 caused an international furor when the state not only required the
extradition of an Irish woman traveling abroad to obtain an abortion, but
would have required her confinement in the country until she gave
birth.'7
Contraception, which is also contrary to Catholic doctrine, was
originally prohibited in Ireland by statute. 74 In 1974, however, the Irish
"6 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Finlay, CJ.).
170 Id.
7 See IR. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Gerard Hogan, Ireland: Chronology 1989-
1993, in Introduction, IR. CONST., cited in CONSTrrUIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 45, at vii-viii. The Fourteenth Amendment gave women the right
to obtain information about abortions in other countries, something which had been in
doubt for several years. See IR. CONST. amend. XIV.
"n See Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1. In the case at bar, the defendant, a
fourteen year old girl allegedly raped by the father of a friend, threatened suicide if
she was not allowed to obtain an abortion. The defendant was granted permission to
obtain an abortion, but miscarried prior to medical intervention. See Weinstein, supra
note 168, at 199.
173 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 154, M1 2371 (noting that
the only legitimate means of birth control in Catholic dogma is the "rhythm" method).
The Catholic church has recognized the power of the state to provide "objective and
respectful information" regarding procreation, but does not authorize "authoritarian,
coercive measures"' or "regulation by means contrary to the moral law." Id. J[ 2372.
Because parents have the ultimate moral right to educate their children, see infra, the
government's providing information about or materials for contraception could be con-
sidered "contrary to the moral law." That seems to be one of the positions taken by
American parents who oppose similar measures. Presumably the Catholic church would
also oppose such coercive methods as the introduction of Norplant under court order
and perhaps even the withdrawal of federal funding for families with dependent
children if more children are added to the family. Even in the United States, these
practices are debatable.
" See Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 §§ 58-59, No. 100 (1861); see also
McGee v. Attorney General [1974] 1 I.R. 284.
19971
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Supreme Court took a bold step forward and found that the Constitution,
which had previously been held to embrace the concept of bodily integri-
ty in a case not dealing with matters of procreation," 5 also encompassed
a right to marital privacy similar to that found in the U. S. Constitution
under Griswold v. Connecticut.6 Although the Court in McGee ac-
knowledged the Christian nature of the Irish Constitution, it noted the
differing viewpoints of various religious denominations concerning
contraception, and so allowed contraceptives to be imported and sold in
Ireland."r
As part of its respect for the family, the Irish state "pledges itself to
guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family
is founded, and to protect it against attack."'78 For many years, divorce
was constitutionally prohibited, but in 1995, in a very close referendum,
the Irish people voted to permit divorce. The precise law has yet to be
drafted.
79
In many countries, including both the United States and Ireland, laws
criminalizing homosexual activity have been justified as protecting the
" Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] 1 I.R. 294.
176 McGee [1974] 1 I.R. 284; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see
also Butler & Gregory, supra note 106, at 455-56.
in McGee [1974] 1 I.R. at 284. Liberalization of contraceptive policy took several
decades, with the final step, availability of condoms from vending machines (as
opposed to through clinics and chemists' shops), coming in 1993. See ARDAGH, supra
note 17, at 182-84; see also Butler & Gregory, supra note 106, at 457.
7S IR. CONST. art. 41(3)(1).
'7 See id. art. 41(3)(2). Under the earlier law, annulments were recognized in
Ireland. See CASEY, supra note 102, at 500-01. Both the ban on divorces and the
recognition of annulments were consistent with Catholic tradition. See CATECHISM OF
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 154, 31 1629, 1644, 2384-85.
One reason for permitting divorce in Ireland was to bring Irish law into accor-
dance with the laws of other states of the European Union, and to reverse certain
social hypocrisies. For example, Irish divorce law was a tricky matter, in which not all
foreign divorces and/or remarriages were considered valid. Those persons having a valid
divorce under the laws of another state would sometimes be able to remarry in Ireland,
but only if the decree of dissolution was valid under Irish law. See IR. CONST. art.
41(3)(3); see also CASEY, supra note 102, at 501-03. However, a foreign divorce was
valid in Ireland even if it did not comply with Irish law, if one party was domiciled
in the foreign state at the time of the divorce. See Domicile and Recognition of
Foreign Divorces Act 1986 § 5(1); see also CASEY, supra note 102, at 502.
Another issue was the many unofficial dissolutions of marriages that were oc-
curring and the subsequent establishment of long-term, unmarried relationships. There
was some concern on the part of the legal community about the rights of the parties
involved in these unions, and the rights of the children, if any.
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institution of marriage.'80 Initially, homosexual conduct was banned by
statute in Ireland, which was found to be constitutional in 1984.81 A
primary basis for the Irish High Court's decision was the Christian nature
of the state." According to Chief Justice Higgins, who wrote for the
majority, the state had a legitimate interest in the community's moral
well-being and was entitled to protect certain values it deemed impor-
tant.
83
The plaintiff, a well-respected professor at Trinity College, Dublin,
took his case to the European Court of Human Rights. 8 ' The European
Court ruled that Ireland had breached the European Convention of Human
Rights, to which it was a party." Finally, in July 1993, a bill was
passed by the Irish Parliament (the Ddil) decriminalizing homosexuality
between consenting adults aged seventeen and over.'86
National laws regarding the care of children are also in accordance
with Catholic beliefs." Ante-nuptial agreements, void at common law,
are enforceable to permit Catholic women to enforce agreements with
non-Catholic fianc6s that their children will be raised as Catholics.'88
Both parents are responsible for the upbringing and education of their
children, and only in exceptional cases will the state intervene.8 9
2. The United States
Over the past two centuries, personal rights in American law have
become increasingly secularized, meaning that religious legal traditions
concerning personal status have less impact on American courts than they
had previously." For example, women have, for many years, been
'" Compare Norris v. Attorney General [1984] 1 I.R. 36 (O'Higgins, C.J.) (noting
the decriminalization of homosexuality would have an inimical an effect on marriage,
an institution the state was constitutionally bound to protect), with Exchange in House
on Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A18.
"' See Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 §§ 61-62, No. 100 (1861); Criminal
Law Act 1885 Amendment § 11, No. 67 (1885); Norris v. Attorney General [1984] 1
I.R. 36; see also ARDAGH, supra note 17, 186-88; Hogan, supra note 97, at 77-82.
8 See Norris [1984] 1 I.R. at 64.
"3 See id.
, See Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1987).
"3 See id.; see also ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 187.
18" See ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 188.
' See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 154, T 2221 (asserting
that it is the "duty of parents to educate their children").
" See CASEY, supra note 102, at 521 (citing Re Tilson [1951] 1 I.R. 2).
89 See IR. CONST. art. 42.
" See Developments, supra note 47, at 1616 n.26.
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regarded as full legal persons, are afforded the vote, 9' and may osten-
sibly enter all areas of the workforce." This system of non-discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender conflicts with some religiously based
opinions regarding women's proper roles in society,"9 but those men
and women who advocate gender-specific roles are still permitted to live
in accordance with their principles. If a married couple feels the woman
should stay home and raise children, she may do so. The only problem
arises when that couple tries to force others to live in accordance with
their religious beliefs.
Women's rights in the United States are most clearly illustrated by
a woman's legal right to an abortion.'94 When that right was recognized
in 1973 in Roe v. Wade, religious activism was at a low ebb, and the
boundaries drawn by the Supreme Court around the right were very
broad. Some state it was Roe v. Wade that marked the beginning of
religious activism, and it is certain that abortion has been a major rallying
point for the movement for over twenty years.'96 The effectiveness of
religious activists in getting local anti-abortion legislation passed and in
'' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
" Recent studies, however, have shown the continued existence of a "glass ceiling"
barring women from upper management. Affirmative action, which was the primary
means by which women were able to break into non-traditional areas of the workforce
including management, is under attack as conservatives try to dismantle it as either (i)
having done its job or (ii) being discriminatory. Compare Lino A. Graglia, Affirmative
Action - Yes: Reverse Discrimination Serves No One, ABA J., May 1995, at 40, 40,
with Kathryn J. Rodgers, Affirmative Action - No: Look at the Facts, Not Rhetoric,
ABA J., May 1995, at 41, 41. As an official requirement, it has virtually ceased to
exist. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995) (stating
that all racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny); Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a law school may not use racial
considerations as an admissions factor); Bras v. California Public Utilities Comm'n, 59
F.3d 869, 874 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that a statut 9 e prescribing goals instead of
quotas is not immune from constitutional scrutiny). In addition, as the culture becomes
more conservative, the model of the ideal woman is held up to be the stay-at-home
wife and mother, despite the fact that very few women can afford that luxury. See
Tamar Lewin, Women Are Becoming Equal Providers, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at
A27. Nevertheless, motherhood is often glorified in the same way as it is in Ireland,
though not at a constitutional level. See Garvey, supra note 4, at 30.
193 See Garvey, supra note 4, at 30.
94 Religious activists view abortion as the murder of the unborn, and believe that
Christians are called to stop such immoral actions, sometimes to the extent of disobey-
ing the law. See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 563-64.
195 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
"9 See MOEN, supra note 15, at 12. Some see the right-to-life movement as an
entry into a larger arena of Christian politics. See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 558.
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successfully defending some of the state restrictions"9 demonstrates the
power of the movement in implementing its moral agenda.' 9
Besides abortion, religious activists focus their energies primarily on
limiting the rights of homosexuals. Although there are very few states or
local governments that enforce anti-gay legislation (often in the form of
penal laws prohibiting sodomy or other "unnatural" acts), the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of such laws.'" The attitude of
state and local governments toward homosexual rights varies widely
'97 See ANn-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at 49-51. Some activists, finding
legal measures too slow or too unwieldy, have resorted to terrorist measures either
through stalking and threats, or even outright murder. See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at
574. Although some commentators believe that only in abortion cases will religious
activism become violent, that has not been the pattern in other countries. Rapoport,
supra note 34, at 445-46. Violence is always possible when agitators become frustrated
with the rate of political change. See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 574. Also, the suc-
cess of some violent measures may encourage others to use similar methods of attack.
For many years, the United States has been immune to terrorist activity from internal
or external sources; however, the luxury of peace seems to be coming to an end in
this country. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Hate Groups an International Cooperative,
WASH. POST, May 11, 1995, at A31.
'9 See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996) (possibly permitting Utah
to ban all abortions, including those stemming from rape or incest, after the twentieth
week of pregnancy); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791 (1992) (upholding a twenty-four hour waiting period and the necessity for
parental consent prior to a minor obtaining an abortion and striking a spousal consent
provision); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 470 (1989) (upholding
a statutory ban on the use of public employees and facilities to perform or assist with
abortions, and passing on the constitutionality of a statutory preamble stating that life
begins at conception); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a statute
disallowing Medicaid funds to reimburse patients for abortions, except where the
mother's life is in danger). In keeping with their de-federalization attempts, abortion
activists have also advocated the total return of abortion issues to the states. This
situation is similar to that in Ireland where abortion is prohibited within the boundaries
of the state, but is permitted in the European Union, thus creating a situation where
abortions are available to those who can afford it. See Weinstein, supra note 168. The
effect is that safe and legal abortions are available for rich women but not for poor
women or teenagers. This raises certain equal protection concerns in the United States
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, poor women will continue to obtain
abortions, as they have throughout the ages, even though those abortions are illegal,
unsafe, and unregulated. Some commentators have noticed that the disdain with which
some religious activists view women with unwanted pregnancies and the disinclination
to help them with their problems is typical of some types of Protestant moralities,
which demonstrate a surprising level of unconcern for many social justice issues. See
Garvey, supra note 4, at 30.
'" See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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across the nation. For example, New York City has prohibited employees
from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation for over twenty
years,' while the state of Colorado recently passed a constitutional
amendment barring any municipality from enacting any sort of protective
legislation. 0 The city of San Francisco now grants certain legal rights
to same-sex unions, and the state of Hawaii is considering doing the same
in one of the more controversial issues of the day.' However, there is
movement at both the state and federal level to deny universal recognition
of such rights.'
Because Hawaii may soon give legal recognition to same-sex unions,
many people believe that other states would be required to give full faith
and credit to such unions pursuant to Article IV of the Constitution.
Religious activists adamantly oppose such actions, fearing a deleterious
effect on marriage and morals in general.' However, unlike Ireland, the
United States is not subject to a constitutional requirement to protect
marriage and/or the family, nor is there any proviso prohibiting the
government from passing laws that would cause "great distress" to
persons disapproving of homosexual relationships." As H.L.A. Hart has
argued, general distress at the perceived immorality of others is not
sufficient grounds for state action.'
In some ways, the legal status of homosexuals in American society
has never looked better. The Supreme Court recently handed down a
See N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107.
20 See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state
amendment prohibiting all laws intended to protect homosexual persons from discrimi-
nation).
' See Carey Goldberg, Virtual Marriages for Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1996, at A12; see also S.F. Archdiocese Compromises on Domestic Partners Law,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1997, at A3 (noting that the Hawaii Supreme Court has indicated
bans against same-sex marriage are unconstitutional if the state is unable to show a
compelling reason for discrimination); Cheryl Wetzstein, Same-sex Unions Top Agendas
in 18 States--Hawaii in Vanguard to Change Law, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1997, at A4
(stating the same).
203 See David W. Dunlap, Fearing a Toehold for Gay Marriages, Conservatives Rush
to Bar Door, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 1996; see also Nagourney, supra note 42 (noting
President Clinton's intent to sign a federal bill prohibiting same-sex unions).
2 See Adam Clyner, Bitter Debate, Then A Vote For Rejecting Same-Sex Marriag-
es, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A18.
205 Cf. Norris v. Attorney General [1984] 1 I.R. 36, 64 (Higgins, C.J.); Hogan, supra
note 97, at 79.
10 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LiBERTY, AND MORALITY 48-52, 79 (1968) (rebutting argu-
ments of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Devlin that the use of penal law to
enforce morality is appropriate).
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surprising six to three decision prohibiting states from enacting legislation
that would bar municipalities from enacting anti-discrimination laws.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, defended the state law on the grounds that
states should be able to wrestle control of the moral climate away from
individual communities that are subject to the "geographic concentration
and disproportionate political power of homosexuals.""° Scalia made
this argument despite having admitted that homosexuals comprise a
minority population which is often reviled by the mainstream. In some
ways this is an unusual argument for Scalia, an ardent anti-federalist and
advocate for state's rights, to be making. In contrast to his usual claim
that control should be localized as much as possible, Scalia here support-
ed centralized action on the part of a larger governmental entity, i.e., the
state. Reading his dissent, however, it seems possible that his opinion
may be influenced by an underlying "animus" toward homosexuality, an
emotion he says may be legitimately codified in the law of Colorado.
However, it was precisely this type of populist discrimination against
minority groups that classical liberalism intended to eliminate.
There is a universal right to marry and divorce21" in the United
States despite the traditional restrictions placed on both by a variety of
Protestant sects.2 1 The traditional nuclear family, though still idealized,
is recognized by many to be a thing of the past as single parents, single-
sex couples, and grandparents raise children 2 Sexual ethics overall
have broken through religiously influenced mores as the availability of
contraception and acceptance of alternative lifestyles increase.' Chil-
See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The same argument could be made of re-
ligious activists who constitute a minority of the population but who also wield
"disproportionate political power" due in part to "geographic concentration," especially
in the South.
See id. at 1629-37; see also id. at 1636-37 (justifying such laws in an attempt
to preserve the majority's view of sexual morality).
2,0 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (noting
that marriage and procreation are fundamental rights); Sullivan, supra note 12, at 205.
21 See CAPPS, supra note 4, at 104-05 (quoting the head of Bob Jones University
as saying marriage between different races is immoral); Garvey, supra note 4, at 30.
2 See KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 226-28.
213 For example, contraception is now readily available to both married and single
people. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding the right to
contraception as a marital right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1973)
(extending the right of contraception to non-married people). Although the Supreme
Court has not recognized a right to engage in homosexual activity, see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), it is generally recognized that state sodomy statutes
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dren, who were alternatively seen as under their father's or mother's con-
trol, are increasingly becoming able to break biological bonds and take
charge of their own destiny.214
However, it is precisely because of the private abandonment of
traditional lifestyles that religious activists want to establish a public order
that would enforce religious ethics." 5 The euphemistic cry of "family
values" may be in reality an attempt to reinstitute biblical norms.216
C. Education
1. Ireland
Education has always been a particularly sensitive subject in the
United States. Ireland has managed to avoid many of the problems
associated with public education in the United States, perhaps because of
Ireland's religious homogeneity and the acceptance of religious education.
For example, the Irish Constitution acknowledges that the "primary and
natural educator of the child is the Family and guarantees to respect the
inalienable right and duty of parents to provide ... for the religious and
moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children."1 7
Parents have the choice of sending their children to state, private, or
home schools.2 ' Primary education is state-supported,2 9 as is most
secondary education.' Both are heavily denominational. Within the last
are not enforced against private individuals. However, official tolerance does not mean
that the danger of enforcement has passed; in fact, the laws could be brought back into
use at any time. See Goodstein, supra note 13.
214 See Stacie I. Strong, Children's Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a New
Goal, 13 B.U. INT'L L. J. 163, 182-86 (1995). For an interesting article concerning the
rights of children in the context of religion, see James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion
and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF L. REv.
371 (1994).
215 See Bruce, supra note 7, at 59.
26 See Goodstein, supra note 13.
217 IR. CONST. art. 42(1). Catholic doctrine teaches that parents have both the right
and the duty to educate their children. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
supra note 154, 2221.
228 See IR. CONST. art. 42(2). The state may not force parents to send their children
to any particular type of school, but can require the parents to ensure "a certain
minimum education, moral, intellectual and social," for their children. Id. art. 42(3)(2).
However, there is very little legislation regarding the minimum standards of education
and the administration of schools; instead, the educational community relies on a variety
of rules, memoranda and circulars authored by the Minister for Education. See CASEY,
supra note 102, at 528 (quoting JOHN COOLANHAN, IRISH EDUCATION 159 (1981)).
2'9 See IR. CONST. art. 42(4).
220 See CASEY, supra note 102, at 528 (noting that the constitutional basis for
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twenty years, some efforts have been made to establish multi- or non-de-
nominational schools, but those efforts have largely failed due to Catholic
opposition. "' Although most Irish schools are state-aided, they are not
owned or operated by the government' m Instead, the state merely pro-
vides funds for communities to use in the creation of schools. Communi-
ties often rely on local churches to establish the schools. Because there
are so few non-Catholics in Ireland, they are often unable to set up
independent school systems, and their children, by default, attend the
local Catholic schools. Although the government may be involved some-
what in the selection of teachers, the sponsoring religious organization
often has a veto power. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the
population is Catholic, Catholic schools are not given preferential treat-
ment in receiving government funding.24
State control over the content of education is limited since, for the
most part, the implementation of the state-set curriculum, including that
of religious instruction, is deemed to be a matter of local concern.2
Withdrawal from religious instruction in schools is permitted. Howev-
er, a state decree of 1971 requiring that "religion should permeate the
whole school day" is still on the books.' Even with the advent of
AIDS, the Department of Education has no set policy on sex education,
which for years was virtually nonexistent.'
2. The United States
Because both devout and non-religious parents are very concerned
about the upbringing and education of their children, public schools in the
United States have become the ultimate battlefield for religious activ-
ists. 9 Historically, religion was a part of American public schools until
funding secondary schools is found in article 42.4).
22! See Hogan, supra note 97, at 90; see also ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 212.
222 See CASEY, supra note 102, at 525.
22 See id.
24 See IR. CONST. art. 44(2)(4).
m See ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 184, 208.
See CASEY, supra note 102, at 569.
2 ARDAGH, supra note 17, at 208, 212-13 (citing proposed 1994 White Paper that
would decrease the role of religion in education).
228 Id. at 184, 208.
' One of the few cases allowing religious interests to influence education is
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which permits Amish parents to keep their
children out of public school after the eighth grade on religious grounds. See also
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that the state may not
"standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
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1962, when the First Amendment was deemed applicable to the states and
school prayer was prohibited. 0 Since that time, the courts have been
trying to define what is an infringement of the First Amendment in the
context of education. Some cases rely on the Establishment Clause, and
focus on whether the state is acting in a way that coerces students or
encourages religion. Other cases review whether a student's right to the
free exercise of religion has been violated." This dichotomy also exists
in non-education First Amendment cases.2
2
The courts have decided that public elementary and secondary
schools are to be secular in the sense that religion per se cannot be
taught. 3 Students may attend private parochial schools, be taught at
home, or be excused from certain classes to accommodate the student's
and the parents' religious beliefs. 4 Unlike in Ireland, religious and
secular schools are not supported by the state equally, although religious
schools are subsidized to the extent that non-religious educational materi-
als (some books, supplies, etc.) may be provided by the state. 5 Howev-
only"). One remaining question is whether an Amish child who wanted to attend a
public high school could do so against his or her parents' wishes.
' See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); see also
Berman, supra note 40, at 782. However, experts disagree about the extent of school
prayer prior to the Engel decision. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 2, at
160-62.
See generally Wallace, supra note 2, at 1204 n.103.
232 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The tension
between the two clauses has led to the belief by some that a constitutional amendment
is needed to harmonize the two lines of cases.
233 See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (pro-
hibiting states and school boards from requiring that passages from the Bible be read
or that the Lord's Prayer be recited in class); Kane & Blum, supra note 64, at 353
n.77. Courses on comparative religions or the Bible as literature are allowed. See id.;
Crowley v. Smithsonian Institute, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir 1980); Wallace, supra note
2, at 1199 n.79. Also, creationism is not to be taught as a replacement or as an alter-
native to evolution theory. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). But cf
CARTER, supra note 2, at 166 (discussing whether the prohibition on creationism
violates the First Amendment). Due to the maturity of college-age students, universities
have been considered different from elementary and secondary schools in some First
Amendment analyses.
' See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). But cf. Wallace, supra note 2, at
1197 n.73.
3 See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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er, no state money may be allotted to the teaching of religion. This
particular provision is currently under debate, as religious activists fight
to have a system of tax credits instituted to decrease the cost of religious
instruction to parents. 26 Religious activists see the voucher system as an
enforcement of the First Amendment, because not to do so disadvantages
devout parents who wish to send their children to schools that will
encourage religion. The argument is that such an approach is more
appropriate than the current system, which is perceived as discouraging
religion. 7 However, under such an approach, members of minority reli-
gions will be disadvantaged, as they are in Ireland, due to their having an
insufficient number of members to create entire school systems."s
The final and most contentious issue is school prayer. Supreme Court
cases currently prohibit teacher-led prayer as well as student- or principal-
led prayer over public announcement systems 9 Despite the explicit rul-
ings of the Court on the constitutionality of these practices, many schools
continue to disregard the law until they are sued.2 This trend can be
interpreted several ways. One is that this is, in fact, a Christian nation,
and court decisions cannot change that essential quality of America life.
Another is that this is a secular nation, and only a few holdout communi-
ties refuse to accept that reality. However, a third position exists. It can
be said that this is a religiously devout country that feels very strongly
that religion should be protected and respected; however, people differ on
how to go about protecting religion, and in practice it is only the ma-
jority religion which is afforded respect and protection.24 Whenever
someone claims the state is violating a First Amendment protection by in-
cluding religion in the schools or public arena, religious activists believe
' See Goodstein, supra note 13. However, this argument ignores the fact that ev-
eryone benefits from public education, since it is in the nation's best interest that all
of its children be taught well. For example, single, elderly, or childless people do not
receive any tax reduction based on the fact they do not have children in the public
schools. The cost of public education must be shared equally by all taxpayers, just as
all taxpayers must share the cost of police and fire departments. To give tax credits to
parents who do not use the public schools is the same as giving a tax credit to those
people who do not put in a distress call to the police or fire department in any given
year, despite the fact that society, as a whole, benefits from the existence of those
services.
See CARTER, supra note 2, at 198-200.
' See KosMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 67 (noting the clustering of minority
religions).
' See Wallace, supra note 2, at 1204 n.103.
240 See KOSMN & LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 186-88; see also Herdahl v. Pontotoc
County School Dist., 887 F. Supp. 902, 905-06 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
241 See CARTER, supra note 2, passim; Sullivan, supra note 12, at 207.
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that the nation is becoming too secular and abandoning traditional reli-
gious values. They do not recognize that Christian prayer in the class-
room or at graduation violates a Muslim's First Amendment rights. The
state is not denigrating religion by prohibiting these actions; it is respect-
ing and upholding it, despite the fact that it does not allow some believ-
ers to speak in some contexts24 2
IV. THE EFFECTS OF INSERTING CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES INTO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Effect of Religio-Legal Unity on Human Rights
As set forth above, Ireland currently has, and some factions within
the United States wish to have, a legal system in which religious princi-
ples are part of the state's constitutional law. That approach has been
supported by many esteemed philosophers throughout the centuries, and
was once believed to be the only way to handle church-state relations.243
242 Religious activists should recognize that there are situations in which the state
may, and perhaps should, limit the speech of its employees. For example, many
religious activists supported the "gag rule" forbidding abortion counseling in state-sub-
sidized family planning or health clinics. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-198
(1991). The gag rule was so extreme that referrals to clinics that performed abortions,
even in addition to other services, were prohibited. See id. The employees' right to
freedom of speech was irrelevant in this situation because the speech would have taken
place in a federal employment setting, and it was determined that the state could limit
the speech of its employees during work hours. The state is doing the exact same thing
in limiting the speech of its employees regarding religious matters while those people
are in their official capacity. No ban has been made on their proselytizing during off-
hours; only when they are at work are they limited in what they can say.
243 For example, St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) was the fast to require a Christian
ruler to compel non-believers to come into the fold. His hope was that physical coer-
cion would change people's internal resistance to God, or at least lessen the opportunity
for them to influence others. See THE POLMCAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 192-93,
196-99, 202-04 (Henry Paolucci ed., 1962). St. Thomas Aquinas (1224(?)-1274 A.D.)
permitted coercion only of Christians, thus seeming to take a less severe position
regarding the official imposition of religion than did Augustine. See Aquinas, supra
note 7, at 61. Aquinas, however, distinguished between external and internal acts, and
required Christians to obey their rulers even when a ruler ordered them to violate
God's law, if such violation only concerned an external act. See id. at 75-76. Presum-
ably Aquinas would permit a Christian government to require citizens to perform
external acts that violated a non-Christian's beliefs, as long as internal matters remained
unaffected. For Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 A.D.), there was no legitimate reason for
civil disobedience. Hobbes believed that civil wars resulted from the separation of
religion and government, and so would require the unification of spiritual and temporal
power in one body. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 371-72 (C.B. MacPherson ed.,
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The simplicity of such a system is deceptively attractive, especially
in a world that is increasingly complex. Whereas the "state" was simply
defined as late as the eighteenth century and made very straightforward
demands on its population, the modem welfare state has expanded its
power into virtually every comer of its citizens' lives, from the bedroom
to the boardroom and beyond.2" Advances in medical technology have
challenged traditional notions of life and death, thereby pressuring people
to make hard decisions regarding which issues government can legiti-
mately regulate and which issues should remain in the religious realm.245
Some people have adopted the position that religio-legal separation is
inconsistent with their individual world view, thereby negating certain
aspects of the classical liberal political model.2  When one must give
perfect and total allegiance to God, it is impossible also to be fully
obedient to the state, which will invariably conflict with certain believers'
conceptions of what is right.247 Therefore, religious activists argue, reli-
gion should not be artificially separated from the affairs of the state.
Despite the problems associated with a secular state, separation of
church and state has become a political ideal for many nations.
Separatism's popularity is due, in large part, to advances made in the area
of human rights, especially the right to religious liberty. Although some
commentators still see no logical inconsistency between the establishment
of religion and freedom of religion,2" or with some alternative arrange-
ment wherein religion is given a voice in law and policy, 49 others see
complete separation as the only method by which religious freedom can
be completely enjoyed." However, virtually every culture views reli-
1985); see also id. at 230, 268, 332-34, 366, 399. If the sovereign then commanded its
subjects to violate God's law, the sin was on the ruler's head, not the subjects', whose
primary duty was to obey. See id. at 405-11, 426-27, 591, 624-25.
244 See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 208, 216-17.
24 For an interesting discussion on how to remove some of the distinctions between
religious and secular debate in this area, see generally RONALD DwoRKiN, LIFE's
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
(1993).
24 See, e.g., Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 839-40.
24 It should be noted that this conflict between God and government occurs not
only in a secular state where religion and law are separated, but also in a theocratic
or theonomous state, because people will always disagree about what is and is not
doctrinally correct, even within the same religion.
24 See Hogan, supra note 97, at 73-74. This approach relies on toleration of the
non-established faiths.
249 See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 961-85.
' See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 12, at 197-98.
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gious rights as important in some way, despite the fact that different na-
tions approach those rights differentlyY
One way of gauging the growing importance of religious rights is by
analyzing the increasing attention given to such rights by the international
community. For example, a state's religio-political regime was once con-
sidered a subject solely of domestic concernY2 Today, however, there
are numerous international conventions that address the subject of reli-
gious liberties. 3 In analyzing how the constitutional systems that cur-
rently exist in Ireland and the United States measure up to international
standards in this area, there are two areas of appropriate inquiry: that of
international human rights law regarding religious freedoms, and that of
minority group rights theory.
1. International Human Rights Law
The concept of international human rights as a protectable interest
was not born until the twentieth century, when the United Nations
became the primary catalyst for official recognition of these rights.
Although the notion of religious freedom had been supported by political
theorists since the eighteenth century, it was very difficult for individuals
living under an oppressive regime to enforce their rights until recently.
Initially, dissidents had few options other than emigration. Today, interna-
tionally binding documents provide for individual relief as well as interna-
tional sanctions upon violation of those provisions." Smaller blocs of
nations have also created regional human rights conventions. 5
"' But cf. Mayer, supra note 131, at 341-42 (decrying cultural relativism in the area
of human rights).
25 See Eric Kolodner, Comment, Religious Rights in China: A Comparison of Inter-
national Human Rights Law and Chinese Domestic Legislation, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN
LJ. 407, 407-09 (1994) (describing the advantages of analyzing a state's practices from
an international comparative perspective as opposed to only from a domestic perspec-
tive).
23 See id. at 410-14. International law has expressly been made a part of both
American and Irish law. See IR. CONST. art. 29(3); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction"); see also Edward D. Re,
Human Rights, International Law, and Domestic Courts, 4 CARDozo J. INT'L & COM.
L. 1, 3 (1996); Jennie Hatfield-Lyon, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia: An Opportunity for
Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Standards, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 331, 337 (1992) ("A court that does not meaningfully consider the international
human rights of its government is giving a judicial override to these obligations,
thereby violating international law and denying justice.").
See Kolodner, supra note 252, at 407-08.
2S See, e.g., Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, reprinted in U.N. GAOR,
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One of the first instruments promulgated by the United Nations after
its creation was the International Bill of Human Rights, which included
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration).
The Universal Declaration is a comprehensive document that enumerates
a variety of rights and protections, including an explicit protection of the
freedom of religious belief.z7 Many of these rights are protected under
similar language in two other fundamental U.N. documents, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)18
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 9
Similar rights are also found in the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), which is
binding on Ireland.'
The first mention of religion in the Universal Declaration appears in
Article 2, which states, "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and free-
doms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as ... religion."' This basic concept, which is also protected by the
other three conventions 2 and is known as the principle of nondiscrimi-
nation, has been described in equal protection terms. These provisions do
not explicitly say whether the state only needs to avoid discrimination by
World Conf. on Human Rts., 4th Sess., Agenda' Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,
157/PC/62/Add. 18 (1993); The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 13 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
European Convention] (including subsequent protocols thereto).
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (m), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
' Interestingly, the preamble itself notes that the violation of these rights can lead,
"as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny," thus recognizing the causal link between
human rights violations and violence within or between societies. Id. at pmbl.
"' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6136 (1966)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
2"9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
o European Convention, supra note 255, arts. 9, 14. The European Convention was
designed to permit enforcement of the Universal Declaration between European
signatory nations. Id. at pmbl.
"' Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 2; see also id. art. 7 (stating that
"[a]ll people are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law"). This echoes one of the express purposes of the United
Nations as stated in articles I and 55 of the U.N. Charter to "promote universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to ...religion." U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55 par. 1(c).
262 ICCPR, supra note 259, arts. 2(l), 4(1); ICESCR, supra note 258, art. 2(2);
European Convention, supra note 255, art. 14.
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public institutions or whether the state must also eliminate private dis-
crimination. Both the United States and Ireland comply with the less
stringent reading, since neither has implemented an official system of
religious discrimination, despite the fact that both permit certain practices
that are de facto discriminatory to continue. 3 However, it is uncertain
in this age of anti-affirmative action whether either country would, or
even could, adopt a policy to eliminate the sorts of subtle discrimination
that exist in the private sphere.' Certainly such actions would be
strongly opposed in Ireland, where the Protestant minority has traditional-
ly been associated with prestige and power, based on its original status as
the moneyed and titled class.
The most specific provision regarding religion in the Universal
Declaration states that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and obser-
vance.
2
6
This provision is identical to Article 9 in the European Convention.'
These provisions demonstrate concepts which have concerned reli-
gious rights activists for years: the principle of nondiscrimination and the
protection of internal matters (thought, conscience) and specific external
263 For example, Professor Kathleen Sullivan has noted that "the [U.S. Supreme]
Court wears blinders, so that it cannot see an establishment of mainstream Christianity
and cannot see free exercise violations of anything else." See Sullivan, supra note 12,
at 216. The reason for this is simple: "[m]ajority practices are myopically seen by their
own practitioners as uncontroversial." Id. at 207. Minority religions are much more
likely to be seen as aberrant practices that violate established social mores, and thus
may be opposed on grounds other than mere anti-religious fervor.
' Because Irish law forbids most discrimination either in favor of or against
religion, see Quinn's Supermarket Ltd. v. Attorney General [1972] 1 I.R. I (considering
whether law permitting kosher shops to open in derogation of the law establishing
normal closing hours was constitutionally permissible and holding that discrimination is
permissible if to hold otherwise would make it impossible for a person to practice his
or her religion), such affirmative action would be difficult to implement. See also
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 7, 15 (1947) (refusing to permit laws which "aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another" to stand).
265 Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 18. Presumably the protection of belief
includes non-belief as well. Both Ireland and the United States recognize atheism equal-
ly with positive religions. Mulloy v. Minister for Education [1975] 1 I.R. 88; Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985).
26 European Convention, supra note 255, art. 9(1).
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practices directly related to religion (teaching, practice, worship). As a
baseline matter, both Ireland and the United States comply with these two
basic tenets. However, the more difficult question goes beyond these
fundamental rights to the problem of whether states should incorporate or
eliminate religious principles in the laws of the state. Few governments
(with several notable exceptions, such as China) can or do forbid or
restrict religious practices per se or discriminate openly on religious
grounds. Many more, however, are willing to impose majority religious
values on the population through supposedly secular laws.
As has been noted above, the area of substantive law where religious
values have the most influence is that of personal rights. Both the Univer-
sal Declaration and the ICCPR contain specific provisions concerning the
rights of the family, including the right "to marry and to found a fami-
ly." 7 In language reminiscent of the Irish Constitution, both documents
state that "[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." The
European Convention grants a similar right, but limits it by subjecting it
"to the national laws governing the exercise of this right." 9 While such
provisions may seem innocuous on their face and are of the type that
religious activists in the United States would like to see incorporated into
U.S. constitutional law, in practice they can be more harmful than
helpful. For example, Ireland has used similar provisions to define
"family" in accordance with majority religious principles. On the other
hand, the United States, which has no such constitutional provision, has
adopted a much more inclusive definition of what constitutes a family.
Some commentators believe that the traditional American focus on the
rights of the individual, as compared to the rights of the family, has been
the cause of this more expansive definition of "family," at least in some
contexts." Protection of the family is a laudatory goal for any society;
however, a limited definition may transform a provision that is meant to
Universal Declaration, supra note 256, arts. 16(1), 16(2).
Id. art. 16(3); see also ICESCR, supra note 258, art. 10(2).
European Convention, supra note 255, art. 12; see also id. art. 8. By basing the
right on national standards, the authors of the European Convention effectively negated
the power of the provision. See Johnson v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5
(1986) (reviewing the interconnection between Irish and European law in the context
of divorce and illegitimacy and holding the Irish ban on divorce did not violate the
European Convention, but legal disabilities attached to illegitimacy did). But cf. F. v.
Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1987) (noting a provision regarding
national law does not permit a state to "restrict or reduce the right in such a way or
to such an extent that the very essence is impaired").
m See MARK W. JANIS, ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXr AND
MATERIAS 239 (1990).
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be protective into one that is, in effect, punitive. Without the incorpo-
ration of an expansive definition of "family," it is perhaps better to delete
all references to the family in a constitutional document. It is particularly
dangerous to tie protection of "family" to a religious ideal, since those
ideals are, by definition, essentially immutable and cannot be adapted to
suit the needs of the present era. If references to the family must be
made, better language is found in the ICESCR, which grants "[t]he widest
possible protection and assistance ... to the family. '
The Universal Declaration states that "[m]otherhood and childhood
are entitled to special care and assistance." Again, this is a seemingly
innocent provision, although it can be interpreted in a paternalistic
manner, thus limiting the career options of women. In many ways, it
seems odd to establish a distinct right to protect mothers and children,
and, to a Westerner, somewhat limiting in that it pigeonholes women into
reproductive roles. The need for basic protection, however, may exist in
other parts of the world, where women are held in such universal disre-
gard that recognition of their importance as mothers is a step forward, not
backward. Nevertheless, a better formulation is one that encourages sim-
ilar protections while recognizing that "working mothers should be
accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits."'
This provision recognizes the universal need of most women to both
work and care for their families.274
All four documents reflect the importance of education. For example,
the Universal Declaration, the ICESCR, and the European Convention all
recognize a personal right to education as well as a parental right to
choose the form of a child's education.27 The right of parents to "en-
sure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
"' ICESCR, supra note 258, art. 10(1). The European Convention does not protect
the family per se, but does state that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life." European Convention, supra note 255, art. 8(1). This right,
which is relatively broad and which apparently creates a right to privacy that would
overcome many religious restrictions regarding what constitutes a proper family, is
subject to an express limitation that conditions the exercise of the right, when neces-
sary, to prevent "disorder or crime" or to protect "health or morals." ICESCR, supra
note 258, art. 8(2). This limitation could easily be used to insert religiously-influenced
prejudices into a rights analysis, and has, in fact, been used in precisely that manner.
See JANIS, supra note 270, at 269-70.
272 Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 10(2).
3 ICESCR, supra note 258, art. 10(2).
274 The only way to improve such a provision would be to grant similar protections
to fathers for paternity leave.
27 ICESCR, supra note 258, art. 13; European Convention, supra note 255, First
Protocol art. 2; Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 26.
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with their own convictions" is expressly recognized.276 Unfortunately,
this clause could create problems, especially in situations where the
parents belong to break-away religious communities or extreme religious
sects. For example, the parents' right to instill their children with their
own values could clash with the child's right to education. Some children
might experience irreparable harm due to premature limitations on their
educational opportunities tm n Others might experience psychological dam-
age due to the anti-social or intolerant teachings of their parents (as in
the case of white supremacist groups espousing "Christian Identity").
However, the more extreme the religion, the more likely it is that it will
offend majority values and thus become the subject of discriminatory
court or legislative action. Such religions require heightened protection
due to their disfavored minority status. The situation is, indeed, difficult
to resolve on a theoretical basis and probably requires a careful case-by-
case analysis.
The ICESCR attempts to address this problem in its provisions
concerning education. On the one hand, it states that "education shall en-
able all persons to participate in a free society, [and] promote understand-
ing, tolerance and friendship among all... religious groups." ' At the
same time, it permits parents to "ensure the religious and moral education
of their children in conformity with their own convictions." '279 Although
some parents' religious rights could be somewhat curtailed under this
provision, at least to the extent that their religion advocated hatred and
intolerance, this approach seems to strike an appropriate balance between
the demands of a free and peaceful society and the need for religious
liberty. It is far superior to a limitation loosely based on societal
"morals," which could be used to restrict any minority religion, even one
that advocated positive, pro-social goals.
In looking at the two nations under review, it appears as if Ireland's
system of publicly supported sectarian schools promotes the second
provision of the ICESCR while possibly violating the first by creating a
society in which religious differences are emphasized rather than mini-
76 ICCPR, supra note 259, art. 18(4); accord European Convention, supra note 255,
First Protocol art. 2. But see Dwyer, supra note 214, at 1405-46 (arguing that these
types of parental rights are anomalous in American jurisprudence).
' The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the right of Amish parents to remove
their children from public schools after the eighth grade, a move which could severely
curtail the career options of Amish children who do not wish to remain in the Amish
community. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); see also Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
m ICESCR, supra note 258, art. 13(1).
Id. art. 13(3).
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mized. Many believe "understanding, tolerance and friendship" are better
taught in an integrated educational framework. ° In the United States,
the segregation of races proved to perpetuate racial inequality and racial
distinctions. Although integration in U.S. public schools has been difficult
at times, it has undoubtedly succeeded in creating a more equitable soci-
ety." Therefore, based on their own experience as well as the experi-
ence of the Irish, Americans should be wary of increasing the religious or
sectarian nature of education through tax vouchers or any other means.
The most surprising point about the above-cited rights is the fact that
all of them are merely conditional. For example, the Universal Declara-
tion states that "in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall
be subject... [to] the just requirements of morality .... ,, The
ICCPR also subjects "one's religion or beliefs ... to such limitations
as ... are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others." ' 3 Such conditional
rights are often illusory, and permit the state to justify otherwise illegiti-
mate acts merely to support the status quo." 4 For example, the Irish
High Court construed provisions similar to these to permit laws outlawing
homosexual behavior to stand. Such laws were later found by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights to violate the European Convention, and
were struck down."'
Any limitation on a religious liberty is immediately suspect. The fact
that the exercise of religion can be limited by the morals of others opens
the door for well-established or majority religions to proscribe the prac-
tices of new or minority religions just because they are different. In the
United States, minority religions are often the subject of invisible discrim-
"2 See James F. Clarity, At Lunch, Belfast Women Talk of a Hunger for Peace,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1996, at A10 (noting that nonsectarian schools might create a
more cohesive society in Northern Ireland).
'' In South Africa, integrated education has also been hailed as the key to achiev-
ing racial equality. See Suzanne Daley, South African School Battle Now a War of
Nerves, N.Y. Tuvms, Feb. 23, 1996, at Al.
22 Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 29(2).
ICCPR, supra note 259, art. 18(3); see also id. art. 19 (granting the freedom of
expression but limiting it under a "public health or morals" clause); see also European
Convention, supra note 255, arts. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2).
' See Mayer, supra note 131, at 317. They also could arguably be said to consti-
tute ex post facto laws due to the inability of defendants to ascertain prior to acting
whether something was contra bonos mores et decorum. See HART, supra note 206, at
6-12.
See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text; Hogan, supra note 97, at 64, 79;
see also Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] 1 I.R. 294, 312 (Kenny, J.) (invoking the
"Christian and democratic nature of the State").
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ination, and many practices are prohibited that would be upheld if they
were part of the majority culture.' This sort of limitation could also be
used to curtail religious speech under the guise of public safety concerns,
as was the case in the United States, where an Islamic cleric was impris-
oned for sedition based on his calls for jihad (holy war). Where reli-
gion is politically tinged, such provisions can easily be used to suppress
non-majority religions even if they do not truly rise to levels threatening
public health or morals.'
There are situations where such limitations are warranted, however.
For example, some religious practices do, in fact, pose a threat to public
safety or, perhaps more commonly, to the fundamental freedoms of other
persons.29 The inclusion of religious or religiously influenced provisions
in constitutional or other laws of the state might fall under this latter
category, at least to the extent that such laws compel non-believers to
conform their behavior to religious standards adopted by the majority
' For example, the use of peyote during Native American religious services could
be penalized, see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), while the use of
alcohol during Christian and Jewish religious services was permitted by exception dur-
ing the Prohibition era, see Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings:
A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 739,
739 n.623 (1996). Both practices are traditional; both practices require participants to
ingest otherwise illegal drugs. The difference is that Christianity is the majority religion
in the United States while Native American religions exist well outside the mainstream.
Another well-known example is the criminalization of polygamy, a practice that
was permitted by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) in the
late 1800s. Such anti-Mormon laws were upheld by the Supreme Court. .Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see CARTER, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that the
Supreme Court's determination that polygamy was "subversive of good order" may have
been based on the Court's finding that "hatred of Mormons caused other people to act
disorderly").
' See United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Joseph
Grinstein, Note, Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment Implications of
Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE L.J. 1347, 1350 (1996); see also
ICCPR, supra note 259, art. 20 (limiting "any advocacy of. .. religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence").
See Mayer, supra note 131, at 317.
s Among the few practices that would not be permitted for public safety reasons
is human sacrifice. Animal sacrifice, when conducted in a humane manner, has been
permitted. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 527-29 (1993). The prohibition on infringement of others' fundamental freedoms
affects a wider range of activities, including marriage and divorce, founding a family,
the right to work, the right to control one's body, etc. Some religio-political hate
groups that encourage interracial violence could also be regulated through this second
provision, since some of their practices violate, inter alia, others' right to life.
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without a non-religious justification.2' For example, a law that required
one type of prayer in school would violate the rights of atheist children
or those who pray differently. Laws barring same-sex marriages or
adoption by same-sex couples would violate a person's right to found a
family. Laws "protecting" women from working in certain fields "unsuited
to their health or capacity" would violate freedoms based on equal rights
between the genders.291 If one reads the religious rights clauses of these
conventions as requiring an analysis of how the recognition of certain
religious rights affects the fundamental freedoms of other persons, then
both the United States and Ireland must reconsider some of their policies,
because both currently curtail some citizens' fundamental freedoms to
give effect to the majority's religious principles.
The most recent U.N. resolution regarding religious rights is the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration on Discrimina-
tion).2" Intended to complement, rather than usurp, earlier conventions
concerning religious liberties,293 the Declaration on Discrimination rein-
forces common elements such as the freedom of religion." 4
M See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 197, 197 n.9. A large number of legal commenta-
tors have written about the wisdom and necessity of permitting religious concerns to
affect laws enacted by the state. John Rawls posits that because society cannot agree
about what constitutes "the good life," political discourse must apply "the method of
avoidance" in order to minimize disputes and achieve societal consensus about the law.
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1987); see also David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil
Society and Culture, 30 SAN DmGo L. REv. 877, 879 (1993). This method requires the
abolition of religious and moral views (both positive and negative) from the political
sphere. See Hollenbach, supra, at 879; Rawls, supra, at 4; see also JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JusTicE 212 (1971) (explaining that the government has neither the right
nor the duty to do what it or a majority wants to do in questions of morals and
religion); Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious
Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1011,
1012-20 (1986) (discussing theories of Rawls, Henkin, and Ackerman as proponents of
a separatist approach). Not everyone views this approach as universally necessary,
however, or even as attainable in a practical sense. See Hollenbach, supra, at 880;
Greenawalt, supra, at 1060-64.
291 ICCPR, supra note 259, arts. 16, 26; see ICESCR, supra note 258, arts. 3, 6, 7.
2 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36155, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51,
at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/55 (1981) [hereinafter Declaration on Discrimination].
I93 d. art. 8.
294 Id. art. 1.
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However, the protections stated herein are more specific than they
are elsewhere.295 For example, discrimination based on religion is specif-
ically prohibited and defined in Article 2.2' Unfortunately, these rights
are subject to a limitation based on public safety and morals, as they are
elsewhere.2 Nevertheless, "[a]ll states" are admonished to "take effec-
tive measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of
religion or belief," and, significantly, are instructed to "enact or rescind
legislation where necessary.""29  This affirmative duty to act is unique
among the religious rights documents, but has not resulted in widespread
change. Parents have the right to raise their children in accordance with
their religious beliefs, although the practices of that religion or belief
must not be injurious" to the child's "physical or mental health."2' To
some extent, this lessens the concerns discussed earlier about possible
irreparable harm to children who oppose their parents' religious views.
However, nowhere in the Declaration on Discrimination are children of
any age given the right to choose their own religion or to reject that of
their parents?' °
Some of the most interesting language in the Declaration on Discrim-
ination is found not in the body of the text, but in the preamble. There
the link between violations of religious rights and societal violence is
explicitly made. For example, the Declaration notes that "disregard and
infringement of ... the right to freedom of ... religion or whatever be-
lief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to
mankind. '  Conversely, "freedom of religion or belief should also
contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace."' The Decla-
ration also notes that "manifestations of intolerance and ... discrimina-
tion in matters of religion or belief [are] still in evidence in some areas
of the world," and considers it
essential to promote understanding, tolerance and respect in matters
relating to freedom of religion or belief and to ensure that the use of
I9 d. art. 6 (elaborating on specific protections).
Id. art. 2 ("'[I]ntolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief means
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and
having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.").
Id. art. 1(3).
Id. art. 4.
29 Id. art. 5.
' See Strong, supra note 214, at 186-89 (arguing for the children's right to self-
determination); see also Dwyer, supra note 214, at 1423 (same).
"' Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 292, at pmbl.
30 Id.
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religion or belief for ends inconsistent with the charter, other relevant
instruments of the United Nations and the purposes and principles of the
present Declaration is inadmissible."
While both the United States and Ireland have complied with the
more technical aspects of the Declaration on Discrimination and other
U.N. documents, neither nation has completely eliminated those provisions
which have "as [their] purpose or as [their] effect nullification or impair-
ment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis."'  Both nations have demon-
strated occasional violations of both aspects of this edict. For example, in
the United States, the prohibition on servicemen wearing religious head-
gear while in military uniform impairs an Orthodox Jewish serviceman's
ability to practice his religion, thus violating a religious right, and effec-
tively bars him from joining the U.S. military, thus infringing on his
economic right to enter any field of employment free from discrimination
on the basis of religion. 5 This case demonstrates how non-Christians'
religious and other rights can be limited in a state that may not intend to
nullify or impair the practice of a minority religion, but that does not
recognize the extent to which majority religious values are embedded in
the laws of the state. Although minorities' religious rights are always at
risk, those violations are in many ways easier to identify than infringe-
ments on minorities' non-religious rights. Both types of rights are,
however, equally important, and should be equally protected.
Ireland's religio-legal system also works to discriminate against
minority religious beliefs, though with less opposition, due to Ireland's
culture and religio-legal history. Although non-Catholics in Ireland find
fewer obstacles to the practice of religion than do non-Christians in the
United States (due perhaps to the fact that Ireland is almost completely
populated by Christians, while the United States has a much more diverse
religious blend), the high degree of influence asserted by the Catholic
hierarchy on the government over the years has resulted in a religio-legal
approach that heavily burdens the non-religious rights of many Irish citi-
zens. For example, the virtual ban on abortion discriminates against
women who do not adopt the Catholic view that life begins at concep-
tion, while the Catholic-style definition of "family" affects those who
have adopted a more expansive view of family.
303 Id.
3 Id. art. 2.
o See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986); see also id. at 524
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the painful and unnecessary dilemma facing Orthodox
Jewish males). The effect of this case was later overturned by statute. See Robin-
Vergeer, supra note 286, at 612 n.91, 677 n.358.
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2. Minority Group Rights Theory
Recently, the field of international human rights has seen a theoreti-
cal shift regarding the concept of collective rights. Prior to World War II,
rights theory focused on the recognition of protections owed by the state
to minority groups or cultures within the state.' With the creation of
the United Nations, the emphasis shifted from minority groups to indi-
viduals,3 7 resulting in the express rejection of group rights in the Uni-
versal Declaration. 3" Recently, however, the United Nations has shifted
its position and has again begun to recognize certain rights regarding
minority cultures."°
Group rights theorists recognize that the critical inquiry regarding the
interplay between law and religion is not whether the state recognizes the
free practice of religion,31 since most nations already protect that basic
freedom. Instead, the key issue concerns protection of religious sub-
cultures within the state and their right to avoid domination by the
majority religio-political culture."'
The analysis is difficult. If minorities are given a special right to
protect their culture, then religio-political differences may become perma-
nently etched into the national legal structure. 12 At the same time, a
state that ignores such sub-cultures may be trampling upon individuals'
legitimate rights. In addition, by accepting the idea that a minority reli-
gious culture should be sustained, society gives credence to religious
majorities' view that they can legitimately structure their society in
accordance with their religious beliefs. The problem raised in the context
of the current discussion is not so much the question of whether minority
' See Eide, supra note 105, at 1319; Kolodner, supra note 252, at 409-10. But cf.
Will Kymlicka, Introduction, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORiTY CULTURES 1, 4 (Will
Kymlicka ed., 1995); see also Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic
Communities in Political Theory, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra, at 31,
31-56.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55 (emphasizing rights "for all").
See Kymlicka, supra note 306, at 18.
30, See generally FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
BELONGING TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, U.N.
Sales No. E.91.XIV.2 (1991) (commenting by a special rapporteur of the sub-commis-
sion on the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities); see also
ICCPR, supra note 259, art. 27.
3"' See Nathan Glazer, Individual Rights Against Group Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 306, at 123, 126.
311 See id.
3,1 See id. at 137.
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groups have the right to assert their cultural identities, but whether
majority groups, i.e., Catholics in Ireland and Protestant Christians in the
United States, have the right to force others to live in conformity with
their religio-political ideals.313
The argument made by religious activists relies on two justifications,
the first of which harkens back to the ideal of classical political liberal-
ism. Religious activists point out that both Ireland and the United States
utilize a democratic political model that is based on the right of the
majority to impose its will on the nation. According to the activists, this
model specifically grants the majority the right to decide what is socially
appropriate for the nation, and to enact laws that will further those social
ends.314 As long as the laws created by the majority do not violate
certain pre-established rights of the minority (i.e., to hold any religious
belief; to practice a religion within certain boundaries created by the
majority to protect public health, safety, and morals; and to be free from
any overt discrimination on the basis of religion), then, proponents argue,
the laws are valid.
There are at least two problems with this philosophy. The first is
that it ignores the explicit limitations discussed above, i.e., that religious
rights cannot be exercised in contravention of others' fundamental free-
doms.1 ' There is a more basic problem with the religious activists'
approach, however, which goes to the root of democratic political theory.
Modem democracies are based on the notion that the majority may
only act in appropriate circumstances and within appropriate boundaries.
For example, the majority cannot force every citizen to run three miles
each day, even if it is for the person's "own good" or because it builds
a better, stronger, healthier nation.316 That sort of law exceeds the state's
ability to act. 317 Similarly, the majority cannot force citizens to conform
3,3 Some modem Catholic commentators have argued that Catholicism does 'not
consider the sovereignty of the individual as the basis of democracy, but instead sees
the strength of collective institutions as democracy's most important element. See
Hollenbach, supra note 290, at 882. This may explain, in part, the acceptance by the
Irish of the power of the Catholic church, an intermediary institution, in state affairs.
314 H.L.A. Hart called this concept "moral populism." HART, supra note 206, at 79.
3,1 See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 292, arts. 2, 7; ICCPR, supra note
259, art. 18(3); see also Sullivan, supra note 12, at 198 (discussing the limits of
religious fights).
316 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 68-69 (1859) (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
1985) (opposing the legitimacy of state or private coercion for citizens' "own good").
3 " Because the health of the population could be said to affect both national safety
(i.e., healthy citizens are needed when it becomes necessary to defend the nation) and
the economy (i.e., healthy citizens cost the state and the insurance industry less in
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to its moral ideal, since the benefits of one particular moral system over
another are less clear-cut than the benefits of an athletic lifestyle versus
a sedentary lifestyle. In addition, there are few costs to the state if
religiously inspired laws are repealed."' Notably, religious activists
cannot claim that the laws are legitimate because devout persons will be
harmed by knowing that others are acting in an immoral manner. As
Professor Hart has noted, mere distress that others are acting in a manner
of which one disapproves is not actionable. 9 To permit such distress
to form the sole basis of the nation's laws would absolutely negate the
idea that individual liberty is a value to be protected." Some additional
reason must exist for such "distress" to be remediable by law.
Some religious activists argue that they should be able to vote their
conscience, and that to force them to justify their actions on purely
secular grounds is unreasonable, given that they do not separate their
lives into public and private realms,32 is a violation of their right to
practice a religion which requires an expansive world view. These activ-
ists misunderstand the proposal, however. Private citizens should be
allowed to vote their conscience, since it is unreasonable and illegitimate
to ask them to do otherwise.3" Public figures should also be able to act
individually as religious persons, if they wish. They should be able to
oppose capital punishment because it usurps God's power over life and
death, for example, instead of basing their actions on the fact that litigat-
ing capital punishment cases costs the nation millions of dollars each
year, or that capital punishment has not been proven to be an effective
deterrent. They cannot, however, propose or enact laws which have no
legitimate secular purpose or which impermissibly infringe on religious or
health care), this type of law could be said to affect public, and not purely private,
concerns.
..8 For example, if the United States truly is a "Christian nation," as religious
activists believe, then abortions will not rise dramatically if they are available on de-
mand, because most of the population is Christian and therefore does not believe
abortion is moral. Nor will the number of homosexuals rise, because Christianity
condemns homosexuals or at least homosexual practices. When put into these terms, it
becomes apparent that the purpose of these sorts of laws is not to "reflect" the moral
nature or quality of the state; it is to force non-believers to conform to the majority
(if there is, in fact, such a majority) religious beliefs without secular justification. Those
who believe in the majority religion will act in accordance with the religious code by
choice.
319 See HART, supra note 206, at 46-47.
320 See id.
321 See CARTER, supra note 2, at 136-45; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at
839.
31 See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 197.
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non-religious rights because they are based on religious principles." To
do so exceeds the proper bounds of legitimate state action. By defining
the analysis in terms of what is a legitimate exercise of state power, one
avoids the more difficult question of whether religious lawmakers should
be forced to choose between their faith and their profession. 4 To pres-
ent religious lawmakers with this either/or proposition would parallel the
either/or proposition given to Orthodox Jewish males who want to serve
in the armed forces.3" That approach, it was argued, violated both reli-
gious and economic rights.
The second argument used by religious activists to permit the
majority to structure society in accordance with its religious beliefs is
based on a combination of minority and religious rights theories. The
claim is that because people must be allowed to practice their religious
beliefs, they must be allowed to impose certain strictures on society at
large, if their religion requires them to do so. Although this duty is more
clearly enunciated in religions such as Islam or Judaism, Christian theol-
ogy arguably supports similar ideals. Certainly both Catholicism and
Protestantism require believers to dedicate their entire lives, both public
and private, to their faith. In addition, Catholics are taught that they are
not only morally responsible for their own behavior, but for the behavior
of others as well." They also have a duty to guard against evil in
whatever form, and may refuse to obey political authority if neces-
sary.Y Many Protestant groups claim a similar duty. Basing their acts
on biblical rather than papal edicts, they attempt to impose their concept
of social justice on the world.3' Although they do not believe their own
salvation is at risk if they do not act in this manner, they consider it their
religious duty to improve society.
Activists who raise this argument view any attempt to limit the
political effectiveness of religious activism as an infringement of their
religious rights. If minority groups are permitted to build and protect
communities that adhere to their religious beliefs, majority religions
should be allowed to do the same.
31 Professor Sullivan supports the notion that the proper analysis of such laws
focuses not on legislators' motives, but on the "post hoc secular rationale" of such
laws. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 197 n.9. This does, in fact, seem to be the
proper approach.
324 See HART, supra note 206, at 79.
3 See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
326 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 154, In 1789, 1865-68,
1896, 1917.
327 See id. iI 1782, 1868, 1902-1903.
328 See Garvey, supra note 4, at 36-38.
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However, this line of reasoning again must fail. Minority groups are
expressly protected because they are minorities. To grant the same
protection to the majority would negate the minority's corresponding
rights to be free of majority influence. In addition, minority rights theory
contemplates the creation of a society (be it a neighborhood, as in Israel's
Hasidic districts, or a community, as in the Amish farmlands) where a
distinct subculture can flourish and, more importantly, from which
dissenting members of the minority can escape.329 Majorities cannot
exercise the same right to create a homogenous religious society because
there is no corresponding opportunity for dissenters to exit, as the entire
nation will embody the majority norm. Any attempt to recognize both
majority and minority rights of a religious culture would subdivide the
nation into discrete religious territories, creating a completely segregated
society. As proven by the United States, South Africa, and even Northern
Ireland, segregated societies are inherently unstable and invariably result
in violence?3
At the end of the day, this theory cannot be justified even on
religious grounds. Religious rights should be viewed as a negative right
forbidding interference by state or private actors except on rational and
necessary grounds. They are not positive rights that permit the imposition
of certain behaviors on others. Just as explicit acts of religious coercion
by the state cannot be condoned,33' neither should implicit acts of coer-
cion. 32 Although minorities may arguably have the right to create mi-
cro-communities which require all residents to conform to religious
strictures, majorities cannot co-opt that right to impose their religious ide-
als on others. Those persons who are sufficiently dedicated to a religious
lifestyle may create those communities by choice, not by law.
" See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 214 n.84; see also Leslie Green, Internal Minori-
ties and Their Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 306, at 257,
264.
" Cf Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political Perspective, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 306, at 139, 148-53 (discussing problems of iden-
tifying ethnic or other privileged groups).
"' Explicit coercion might consist of forcing persons to attend religious services or
swear allegiance to a particular deity.
32 Implicit coercion might consist of refusing to grant health care benefits to same-
sex or long-term unmarried couples, based on traditional religious prejudices.
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B. The Intersection of Law and Religion and Its Effect on Societal
Violence
As has been suggested by the Declaration on Discrimination,33 the
combination of law and religion can ultimately result in violence. Tradi-
tionally, that violence took the form of repressed minorities rebelling
against state oppression.334 Today however, religious activists rebel not
against religious repression, at least not religious repression in the classic
sense, but against religio-political separatism.335 Many conflicts are re-
solved through the political process, but some are not, especially when
activists view the state and particularly the judiciary (which is beyond po-
litical influence), as promoting anti-religious ideals. 6 In such situations,
religious activists often resort to violence. 7
To some extent, legitimizing religious values in the law of the state
leads to an express or implied legitimization of religiously based violence.
When politics adopt a religious tinge, people become willing to die or to
kill over issues which, in other societies, could be accepted as mere
political differences. By inserting religion into the debate, however, states
unknowingly permit those who would answer to a "higher power" to
resist those laws they feel to be immoral or unjust. Compromise becomes
impossible as difficult questions are swept away as something that must
be accepted on faith.
The link between violence on the one hand and religio-legal unity on
the other is obvious. First, religious principles must be taken on faith.
There is no room for debate or discussion, since a religious position is
grounded in unique spiritual truths. Religious doctrines are, by definition,
immutable, and incapable of compromise.
When religion is combined with law, political debates and compro-
mise become impossible, since changing policy is equated with changing
religious beliefs. Although wars over what is the "one true" religion are
for the most part a thing of the past, people are still willing to fight to
protect their right to live in accordance with their beliefs. Violence is
common enough when it is a political ideology at stake; how much more
common it will become when it is linked with eternal truths and salvation
can only be surmised.
... Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 292, at pmbl.
" This was the concern of many Enlightenment philosophers. See Schwarzschild,
supra note 20, at 905.
... See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 839.
" See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 558-63.
31 See Rapoport, supra note 34, at 432. Many such activists claim to be restoring
social harmony, but that is seldom the result. See id. at 440.
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When religious activists and their opponents recognize that compro-
mise is impossible, two types of violence occur. The first is religious
revolution, such as that which occurred in Iran in 1979. There clerics
banded with the middle class and the intellectual elite to push the Shah
from power, and then wrestled control from the more moderate elements
to form an Islamic republic 8 A similar phenomenon took place in
Ireland in 1937. The moderates who drafted the 1922 Constitution were
replaced by more vocal republican elements who, while not handing over
the reins of government to the Catholic hierarchy, created a much more
religiously oriented constitution than had been seen previously.339 The
United States could now be facing a similar situation. Over the last few
years the United States has experienced not only a rise in religio-political
activism, but the creation of coalitions between religious activists and
conservative elements of the Republican party. It is apparent that the re-
ligious faction is gaining more and more of a voice in Republican
policies and in government overall, with no end in sight. Though some
believe the unique aspects of American politics will forestall a violent
revolution, the possibility of a legislative revolution looms large.
The second type of violence that appears in the religio-political
context can broadly be labeled as issue-oriented terrorism. 4' Perhaps
inspired by the eco-terrorism of certain radical ecological groups in the
1970s, or by the longstanding religious tradition of martyrdom in the face
of state repression, these religious activists believe violence is justified to
thwart certain improper government actions.342 The most well-known
religious terrorists are those who oppose abortion. These people have
resorted to bombing, stalking, and murdering to stop what they perceive
as the murder of unborn children 43 Answering to a "higher power,"
these activists justify their actions on the grounds that any action is
permissible to stop a greater harm from being accomplished.3" Violence
is also used to combat governmental actions that are merely perceived as
illegitimate, as opposed to ungodly. A growing number of separatist
groups in the United States oppose federal taxes and other actions based
on their "god-given" right to own certain lands and live as they
... See RiTHVEN, supra note 21, at 337-38.
See Lynch, supra note 97, at 329.
See Rapoport, supra note 34, at 455.
' This label distinguishes it from the more general international terrorism that
peaked in the 1970s and early 1980s.
' See Rapoport, supra note 34, at 446-47 (noting that the type of violence used
often has religious overtones).
' See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 561-63.
34 See id. at 562.
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please.345 Although many outsiders see these actions as purely political,
the participants themselves use religious concepts and language to justify
their acts.
Some may say that violent factions exist in any society, and that
there is little or nothing that can be done. It is interesting, however, that
the incidence of religious violence in the United States only began to rise
when religious activism began to take the national stage.3" One expla-
nation for this coincidence is that both movements arose out of a similar
cause, i.e., excessive secularization in an inherently religious society. It is
also possible that those who practice violence saw their agendas (if not
their methods) legitimized by the role religion began to play in American
law in the 1980s, and felt that their actions were only a more extreme (or
more devout) method of expressing what was already occurring in the
political mainstream. Interestingly, U.S. activists are turning to violence
just as the Sin Fein party (which is the political arm of the terrorist
Irish Republican Army) is beginning to disavow it. Nevertheless, by
continuing to allow religion to affect the laws of the nation, states
become susceptible to reinforcing religious terrorists' perception of what
is permissible and/or attainable and what is not.
V. CONCLUSION
As Ireland and the United States move into the twenty-first century,
they face the possibility of radical change to their existing religio-legal
systems, although in opposite directions. In both cases, reform is being
fueled by majoritarian demands rather than by a reasoned human rights
analysis, despite the fact that religious rights are, or should be, considered
beyond populist control. This sort of approach to law and religion can
result in numerous jurisprudential inconsistencies as well as human rights
violations. In addition, such systems can encourage religio-political
violence, as those who answer to a "higher authority" see their ends
legitimized by mainstream society.
The best way to address the problems faced by both Ireland and the
United States is to adopt an explicit and internally consistent approach to
religious rights. International human rights law, which is not subject to
the vagaries of the common law, is beginning to formulate just such a
system. Traditionally, the international community has required only that
states apply the principles of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion,
freedom of internal belief, and freedom of external religious practices to
"' See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Freemen's Theological Agenda: Group Embraces
Racist 'Christian Identity,' WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1996, at A3.
31 See Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 562.
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the extent that such practices are inherent parts of all religions (i.e.,
worship, teaching, etc.). Under this analysis, both Ireland and the United
States do relatively well. However, the concept of religious rights has
now expanded to include not only the three traditional rights, but a
recognition of the proper scope of religious rights as well. According to
the Declaration on Discrimination, states may not make any distinction or
restriction based on religion or belief which has "as its purpose or as its
effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise of human rights and fundamental freedoms." '347 If properly enforced,
this provision will effectively limit the ability of the majority to enact
religiously based laws that infringe upon any sort of established right or
freedom. This minor limitation on the "right" of the majority to impose
its religious views on others seems an appropriate balance to strike in
light of the modem belief that all religions should be treated equally.
Neither Ireland nor the United States has explicitly adopted this new
approach, preferring to limit themselves to the traditional rights analysis
under the guise of existing national standards.3 As a result, both na-
tions engage in certain improper practices. For example, the Irish law's
definition of "family," which is based on majority religious beliefs, has
resulted in the infringement of certain people's right to found a family.
In the United States, education is considered a fundamental right, yet in
many areas the majority insists on its "right" to include religion in the
curriculum despite the fact that such practices not only infringe upon
minorities' religious rights, but upon their right to an education as well.
Although some Irish and American citizens are willing to adopt this
expanded version of religious rights, including limitations on the ability
of the majority to affect others' fundamental freedoms, many are not.
Those who oppose this new vision of religious rights can find support for
their position in the constitutional laws of both nations.
One of the most important factors militating against any expansion
of religious rights in Ireland is the religiosity of the Constitution, espe-
cially the preamble. The specific inclusion of Christianity in the state's
foundational legal document is the most difficult barrier for reformers to
overcome because it influences all substantive areas of the law by defin-
ing the appropriate interpretive principles. Certainly Irish courts have
relied on this provision in the past. 49 However, this sort of clause is
Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 292, art. 2.
Under these standards, Ireland may expressly adopt certain religiously influenced
laws based on the language found in the preamble of the Constitution, while the United
States may continue to discriminate against non-mainstream religions while claiming to
enact religiously neutral laws.
' See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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only permissible from a human rights perspective as long as the whole
society shares the view that inclusion of religious values in the secular
law is legally permissible.35 Once a portion of the population rejects
that basic principle, the continued unification of law and religion becomes
suspect, thus requiring some sort of rights analysis. Ireland, though once
an extremely homogenous nation, is not the cultural isolationist it once
was. Increased contact with Europe and the rest of the world has brought
about significant change in the belief and behavior patterns of the Irish.
With change comes diversity, and it is to be expected that there will be
increasing demands to remove religious elements from Irish law. The first
steps have been taken through the legalization of divorce, the decriminal-
ization of sodomy, and the loosening of restrictions on abortion. To some
extent, these changes reflect a recognition that the state may not burden
certain people's fundamental freedoms to uphold others' religious views.
It remains to be seen, however, whether Ireland's move toward
secularization will be done at a moderate enough pace so as to avoid
violence, or whether change will be so abrupt as to cause an unacceptably
high amount of societal tension. Ireland has a history of violent religio-
political conflict, but further violence may be avoided if change is seen
as coming from within, as opposed to being imposed from without. It
will also be helpful if the Irish see certain secularizing changes as the
price they must pay to participate in the European Union and world
economies; in such situations, people are often willing to sacrifice certain
rights or privileges to obtain benefits that are of greater value to
them.35' In addition, Ireland may benefit from being one of the last
nations in the Western world to secularize. By the time Ireland eventually
incorporates certain notions into its laws, those principles will have been
firmly established elsewhere and will no longer be seen as highly contro-
versial.352
" If the whole society agrees that religion should be part of the nation's law, and
the society can agree sufficiently as to the form of that defining religion, then even the
most devout adherent of Rawlsian political theory must agree that such laws are
legitimate. See supra note 290 (discussing political theories of John Rawls). The
problem is that societies are seldom as homogenous as religious activists would like to
admit.
3-, Traditional Irish may also be able to support these measures by recognizing that
the fabric of society need not change just because the laws have; those behaviors that
were an honest reflection of Irish culture and values will still exist, although now they
will be exercised by choice rather than required by the state.
352 Abortion and divorce are cases in point. Ireland resisted change on both subjects
for as long as possible, but when change came the debate was vocal but not violent.
The tone of the debate also focused on whether these measures were consistent with
Irish culture, not whether they were legitimate rights in the abstract. Those theoretical
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To accommodate this anticipated change, Irish courts may adopt the
reasoning of McGee 53 Essentially, the argument is that because differ-
ent religious denominations take different viewpoints on certain contro-
versial issues, the state should take a neutral or non-interventionist
position. In a way, the McGee Court was enunciating a Rawlsian concept
of political theory, recognizing that where religio-legal consensus does not
exist, the law must refrain from acting on religious motives.
The United States faces different obstacles to an adoption of the
expanded version of religious rights, the most obvious being the current
electoral strength of religious conservatives who want to impose their
values on society and who believe it is permissible for them to do so.
However, the principles of the U.S. Constitution are much more in line
with the principles of the expanded rights framework than are those of
the Irish Constitution, thus making it relatively easy to adopt the frame-
work once the political mood has shifted to a more liberal approach.
If and when Americans decide to implement the expanded vision of
religious rights, it is possible to do so without fundamentally altering
existing law. For example, basic First Amendment notions concerning the
free exercise of religion and the prohibition on the establishment of
religion are mirrors of the three traditional rights recognized by the
international community. The problem is that neither of the two First
Amendment concepts adequately protects the rights of minority religious
practices that are not specifically linked to worship.354 By adopting the
express freedoms and limitations in the proposed rights analysis, Ameri-
can courts will avoid some of the unnecessarily strained analyses that
have marked past First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, the
proposed religious rights framework draws a proper and more easily
identifiable line between competing interests by focusing on the effect of
one person's actions on another. If such actions nullify or infringe upon
religious or other fundamental freedoms, then they cannot be permitted.
Certainly this approach is much more coherent than the current tests.35
It also has the additional benefit of focusing exclusively on the protection
of citizens' fundamental freedoms as opposed to the protection of the
state's administrative practices.35
debates had already been, for the most part, concluded in other nations.
" McGee v. Attorney General [1974] 1 I.R. 284; see supra note 177 and accom-
panying text.
"' One example of such an infringement is the judicial prohibition of wearing
religious headgear while in military uniform. See supra note 305.
- See supra note 81, particularly the discussion of Free Exercise jurisprudence; see
also Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 20, at 851-58.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
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This framework makes sense as a practical matter as well. First, the
framework adequately protects those rights that are recognized under
current American law. Second and more importantly (at least to the
question of whether the American public will embrace the new approach),
the proposed framework expressly addresses the key claim made by
religious activists, namely that they have a democratic right to shape
society in accordance with their wishes. By focusing the analysis on the
effect of the intended action on others' fundamental freedoms, religious
activists may be forced to recognize how their actions affect others.
Because few people oppose the proposition that everyone's religion
should be respected equally, religious activists might eventually agree to
withdraw from the political realm, at least to the extent that they advocate
the enactment of purely religious legislation.357 The fact that most reli-
gious activists attempt to justify their involvement in the political arena
on political, rather than purely religious, grounds means that this proposal
might eventually become an acceptable compromise for all. For those reli-
gious activists who believe that they must insert religious values into
secular law because it is their religious duty to do so, such compromise,
indeed any compromise, is impossible. For this latter group, total victory
and total defeat are the only alternatives available. 5
concurring in judgment) (recognizing the need to occasionally burden the free exercise
of religion, but disagreeing with the majority, which "suggests that the disfavoring of
minority religions is an 'unavoidable consequence' under our system of government and
that accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process"); see also
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (holding that the state's interest in
requiring recipients of government benefits to be identified by a Social Security number
outweighed a Native American's admittedly sincere claim that such practice violated his
religious beliefs).
3"7 Again, religious activists would still be allowed to campaign for or against
certain legislation on the grounds that it violated religious principles, as long as there
were legitimate, secular reasons for the legislation to be proposed in the first place. See
supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
3. It is this latter group that is most responsible for the religio-political violence in
society. Although these persons will still be able to justify their actions by resorting to
a "higher authority," their political ends, i.e., a religiously ordered society, will no lon-
ger be legitimated by the majority culture. Therefore, it is possible that they will
recognize that their means are equally impermissible. It will also be easier to identify
those behaviors that should be curtailed and penalized because the emphasis will be on
the effect such actions have on others rather than the religious sincerity or recognizabil-
ity of such acts. However, it is also possible that these persons may see this type of
framework as obviating all possibility of political change in their favor. When this type
of fatalism sets in, people become more likely to resort to violence as the only
available method of political change. However, given the history and culture of the
United States, it seems that the first outcome is the more likely of the two.
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As has been evident throughout this Article, any debate over the
proper role of religion in law is extremely complex. For every right that
is considered absolute there are possible exceptions, and for every argu-
ment there are counter arguments. However, the only way to progress in
this area is to recognize what the purpose and the effect of religiously
influenced laws are, and to decide whether society is willing and able to
accept the costs associated with those laws. There are drawbacks to both
a unified and a separationist approach, but the question each society must
answer for itself is which drawbacks are most acceptable to it. This
Article suggests that it is possible, and in fact preferable, to create a
secular society in which all persons' religious rights are respected and
protected. Although there will be some minor limitations placed on the
outer boundaries of those rights, those limits are necessary to protect
other persons' religious rights and fundamental freedoms. Because it is
impossible for all persons to exercise all their rights simultaneously, this
Article supports the idea that it is better to create some small limitations
on all persons' rights than to impose large limitations on certain minority
groups. As John Stuart Mill said, "There is a limit to the legitimate in-
terference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find
that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a
good condition of human affairs as protection against political
despotism."359
"5 MILL, supra note 316, at 63.
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